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FORENSIC CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
BRIAN F. HAVEL"
INTRODUCTION
The gist of constitutional interpretation should be an amena-
bilityto competing and even complementary schools of hermeneu-
tic endeavor.' This ideal collides with an intellectual seduction,
nurtured within the legal academy, of monotheism-a belief in
the possibility of one true theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion.2 Scholarly argument notwithstanding, it is unlikely-and
empirically unprecedented-that a judge would pivot the entire
outcome of a constitutional dispute on, let us say, the presence
or absence of a comma in the Exceptions and Regulations Clause
of Article III (the Judiciary Article),' the repetition of the word
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Susan A. Bandes, Mary E. Becker, Graeme B. Dinwoodie, David J. Gerber, and
Mark C. Weber for their comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to Andy
Eastmond and Chad Beaver for their exceptional research assistance, and to the
DePaul University College of Law for a grant to support this project. This Article
has also benefited from a faculty workshop discussion at Chicago-Kent College of
Law.
1. As Paul Stephan maintains, constitutional law has always lacked a broad con-
sensus about its purposes and methodology. See Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and
International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 NW. J. INTL L. & BUS.
681, 733 (1996-97). Indeed, this very fact marks the baseline for serious discussion
of modalities of interpretation.
2. The fallacy of monotheism appears to be common among constitutional theo-
rists. See Frederick Schauer, The Occasions of Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U.
L. REV. 729, 736 (1992) (assuming the inevitability of a forced choice among theories
that variously emphasize plain meaning, original intent, underlying purpose, political
policy, or moral theory).
3. See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A
Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 741,
778-80 (1984) (quantifying congressional power to curtail the appellate jurisdiction of
the United States Supreme Court by arguing that an "overlooked comma" in Article
IH, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution (the Exceptions and Regulations Clause),
inserted after the word "Exceptions," indicates in its textual setting that Congress
has the power to delete a class of cases from the appellate jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court, but only in favor of the exercise of power by an inferior federal court).
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"in" in the Vesting Clause of Article III,' or the sudden caesura
in the litany of "alls" in the Cases and Controversies Clause of
Article II. It is also unquestionably hard to (re)build accurately
a putative original intent of the Framers; the historical trails
are manifestly incomplete,6 dismayingly tenuous, and probably
distorted by the relativism of modern exegeses.7 Furthermore,
practical American lawyers are usually edgy in the face of high
formalism;8 if the text becomes hostage to anarchic and unpre-
dicted meanings, the holy grail of deconstructionist ideology, it
may not yield any sensible explanations at all.9
These and other theories may prove separately inconclusive or
overambitious, but each is merely a facet of an eclectic discourse
that judges in the United States use to interpret the Constitu-
tion. Eclecticism, at the root of the common law, means a rea-
4. See Julian Velasco, Congressional Control over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A
Defense of the Traditional View, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 671, 700-02 (1997) (interpret-
ing the repetition of the word "in" in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, which
states that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested "in" one Supreme
Court and "in" inferior courts established by Congress, to mean that the entire judi-
cial power is vested in the Supreme Court, and also in the inferior courts; and that
this separate vesting allows a permissive reading under Article III of Congress's
power to curtail or even eliminate most of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court).
5. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 242-45 (1985) (arguing that the
use of the word "all" before only some of the cases and controversies that define the
scope of the judicial power in Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, could not have been
unintentional; this differentiation must mean that the first three catego-
ries-preceded by "all"-necessarily implicate the federal appellate power, while the
remaining six categories may be excluded by Congress from any federal review).
6. See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Susan J. Brison, A Philosophical Introduction
to Constitutional Interpretation, in CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 1, 10 (Susan J. Brison & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 1993).
7. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAK-
ING OF THE CONSTITUTION at xv n.* (1996) (criticizing the search for original intent
as an undemocratic subjugation "of present generations to the wisdom of their dis-
tant (political) ancestors"). Rakove adds mordantly that he likes originalist argu-
ments "when the weight of the evidence seems to support the constitutional out-
comes I favor," a position that "may be as good a clue as to the appeal of
originalism as any other." Id.; see also infra notes 62-89 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing originalism's shortcomings as a monotheistic theory).
8. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 249 (1999) (discussing the preference of American legal culture for
rules and analogies rather than philosophical abstractions).
9. See infra note 33 (discussing deconstructionist methodology).
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soned integration of many different sources. 10 This Article in-
troduces a "construct" of constitutional interpretation," which I
dub forensic constitutional interpretation,' that repudiates
monotheism and relies explicitly upon common law methodology.
The construct has three deeply linked components. First, it
seeks well-reasoned and persuasive opinions that fit beneath the
eclectic methodological canopy of the common law.'" Second, by
embracing eclecticism it recognizes that interpretation should
not beguile the interpreter into the fallacy of monotheism. Third,
confident in its methodology, it avoids any pretense that judges
are discovering, as opposed to constructing, constitutional mean-
ing.14 Whatever courts may do in other contexts, forensic inter-
pretation expects that when judges interpret the Constitution
they are well aware of the intended outcome of their exercise. By
force of the first and second components of the construct, however,
those outcomes will acquire coherence and endurance only
through the rigor of the common law method and tolerance for
polytheism in constitutional interpretation.
This Article has three Parts. Part I examines a select class of
representative constitutional theories in order to reveal the con-
ceptual inadequacies of interpretive monotheism. The theories
comprise virtually the entire bandwidth of modern constitutional
analysis, from rigidly formalistic to unabashedly outcome-driven.
Then, Parts II and IH explain the nature of forensic constitu-
10. See WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE: UNABRIDGED 574 (2d ed. 1983).
11. I use the word construct deliberately. A construct is the complex product of
many more specific and necessarily simpler components. This Article, then, offers a
process of constitutional analysis that integrates existing constitutional theories within
the conventional eclecticism of the common law. Its purpose is to encourage inter-
pretive coherence; it does not itself present a set of new general propositions that
will uncover or guide constitutional meaning.
12. "Forensic" means related to the process of courtroom reasoning and analysis.
See THE RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 750
(2d ed. 1993). In the somewhat enlarged usage claimed here, the word "forensic"
encompasses also the epistemological traditions of common law advocacy, shared by
lawyers and judges alike. See infra note 132 (discussing the legal profession's reli-
ance on a shared epistemological tradition).
13. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text (discussing applicable common
law methodology).
14. See Laurence H. Tribe, Comment to ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRE-
TATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 65, 71 (1997).
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tional interpretation. The argument develops in three phases.
Part II.A organizes forensic interpretation around interlocking
acts of eclectic reasoning: the institutional methodology of the
common law itself and (as a conceptual ramification of the com-
mon law method) a polytheistic integration of different interpre-
tive theories. Part IIB makes an intimate connection between
the outcome sensitivity of judges and the art of interpretation,
and pairs this insight with the common law's instinct for foren-
sic rationalization. Finally, Part III is an applied demonstration
of forensic methodology. It uses two Supreme Court judgments
delivered more than twenty years apart, in 1978 and 1999, both
of which rebuffed federal encroachments into areas of retained
state prerogative. These opinions manifest the Court's quiet but
persistent allegiance, despite the tumult of theory, to the eclectic
practices of forensic constitutional interpretation.
I. INTERPRETiVE MONOTHEISM: A CRITIQUE OF THEORIES
Despite, or maybe because of, two centuries of explicating the
Constitution, there is still no hegemonic school of interpretive
scholarship. The Supreme Court has never endorsed a preferred
theory, ranked constitutional theories, articulated a canonical in-
terpretive system, or collapsed the fourth wall and admitted that
it was using any particular theory."5 In Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,6 Justice White, in a
dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, delivered a startling
verdict on textualism and originalism-two voguish theories of
the past decade-when he described as simplistic the view that
constitutional interpretation could possibly be confined to the
plain meaning of the Constitution's text or to the subjective in-
15. This reluctance to commit has been true, also, of the Justices in their individ-
ual capacities. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 9 (asserting, with respect to the five
Justices who make up the "analytical heart" of the present Court-Justices Ginsburg,
Souter, O'Connor, Breyer, and Kennedy-that they do not adopt theories, "they de-
cide cases"); see also STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERIcAN CONSTrrUTIONALisM: FROM
THEORY TO PoLITIcs 147 (1996); Martin A. Rogoff, Interpretation of International
Agreements by Domestic Courts and the Politics of International Treaty Relations:
Reflections on Some Recent Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 11 AM. U.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 559, 612 (1996).
16. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
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tentions of the Framers.'7 This Part of the Article amplifies Jus-
tice White's bruising critique, for which his predicate was surely
not the inherent heresy or error of these theoretical methods but
rather their monotheistic vanity.
Formalistic theories-notably textualism, structuralism, and
originalism-are sometimes thought to be solely descriptive in
the sense that judges who apply them will merely discover or
report an immanent, preexisting meaning."8 This supposition is
understandable because formalistic theories are so preoccupied
with acts of conceptual manipulation. These theories are also
positivist in the sense that they purportedly offer a value-free,
externally conditioned set of interpretive procedures. 9 Formalis-
tic theories, however, are also prescriptive, or outcome sensitive,
in that they direct attention to the text, or to the structure, or to
original intent. They make an implicit normative judgment-a
prescriptivist judgment, in fact-that text, structure, or original
intent ought to predominate in constitutional analysis." By
embracing prescriptivism, even in this narrow sense, formalistic
theories open the door to discretionary outcomes, and, as a re-
sult, cannot guarantee to inoculate judges against a predisposi-
tion toward construction, rather than discovery, of meaning.2 As
17. See id. at 789 (White, J., dissenting).
18. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 171-75 (1995).
19. Value-free, context-insensitive interpretive models have not flourished in our
legal culture: "Virtually all agree that to characterize a judge or lawyer's analysis as
formalistic is seriously to condemn it." ROBERT SAMLE SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM
AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 278 (1982); see J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the
Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 143 (1988). The Supreme Court,
after a flirtation with a formalist reading of the judicial power in Article III, repudi-
ated this analytical approach in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co,,
473 U.S. 568 (1985), in which it concluded that "practical attention to substance
rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform application of
[the Judiciary Article of the Constitution]." Id. at 587. Judge Richard Posner's theory
of pragmatism, see infra notes 103-12 and accompanying text, rejects formalist theo-
ries as an "unworkable response to difficult cases" because of the complexity of the
legal system in the United' States-an agglomeration of statutory and common law,
federal and state law, and federal constitutional law, with the added wild card of a
profusion of undisciplined legislatures. See POSNER, supra note 18, at 12-13.
20. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson, Introduction: Constitutional
Conversations, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 1, 6 (Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL
STUPIDITmS].
21. See Tribe, supra note 14, at 71.
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this Part shows, outcome sensitivity pervades formalistic theo-
ries as naturally as it does the overtly prescriptivist theories
-the pragmatism of Richard Posner, or Ronald Dworkin's rights
jurisprudence.22 This second set of theories typically is not con-
cerned with recommending interpretive tactics or techniques.
Instead, these theories urge judges to aspire to qualitative out-
comes that may have very abstract appeal.2" Among these out-
comes are economic efficiency or social utility, or social justice
and the enhancement of individual rights.
Thus, the spectrum of constitutional theories in this Part
reflects two prescriptivist outlooks. Formalistic theories are meth-
odologically prescriptive, directing attention to text, or to history,
or to structure. On the other hand, substantive pre-scriptivism
directs judges toward explicit outcomes. As a construct, forensic
interpretation appears closest to methodological prescriptivism.
Thus, it expects that outcomes, whatever their putative ideologi-
cal coloring, will be the product of a reasoned eclecticism. Given
this apparent close association, my critique begins by focusing on
the principal constitutional theories in the category of formalism.
A. Methodological Prescriptivist Theories
1. Textualism: Formalism's Vanguard
The quintessence of textualism, as Justice Antonin Scalia
describes it, is the respect for democratic government that is
assured by examining only what the lawgiver-here, the Fram-
ers of the Constitution-promulgated, and the avoidance of
open-ended hypothesizing about what the lawgiver meant.2 4 In
taking this view, Justice Scalia demonstrates immediately the
prescriptive potential of a formalistic theory: in purporting to
confine the interpreter to the written words of the Constitution,
it fulfills a broader normative strategy of reining in judicial
discretion.
22. See infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
24. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in SCALIA,
supra note 14, at 3, 17.
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Textualism as formalism might hold the promise of reliable
and predictable analysis, until the conceptual instability of the
textual matter itself is understood. In a textualist analysis of the
reach of federal jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution,
for example, Professor Akhil Reed Amar seems close to an apology
for what he calls "the sort of precise and technical parsing" that
permeates his essay.25 In a commentary on the Fourteenth
Amendment, offered in the same essay, he exposes his own am-
bivalence about the promise of this kind of textualism. Amar
argues that, in contrast to Article Ill, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has a "different rhythm and feel: it speaks in terms more
lofty, general, and open-ended."26 Faithfulness to the text of the
Amendment, he reasons from this premise, apparently invites "a
higher level of interpretive generality and a different mode of
legal analysis."27 Though appreciating the plausibility of Amar's
exegetical distinction, it is nonetheless unsettling (even if he
might be a rueful textualist) to read his confident solipsistic
reflections on the "rhythm and feel" of one provision of the Con-
stitution versus another, as though that kind of warp-and-weave
subjectivity could itself become the metric that decides the
choice of outcomes in constitutional analysis.
The truth is more centered. Technical readings do have a high
place in our legal system; it would be inept for an interpreter to
overlook the complex interweavings of a text like Article HI that
was manifestly written with the quotidian operations of govern-
ment in mind.2" Amar's self-reproach should not be for an ear-
nest textual exegesis, therefore, but rather for allowing an im-
plicit assumption that the words themselves might complete the
interpretive inquiry. As Amar acknowledges implicitly, the lin-
guistic imprecision of the Exceptions and Regulations Clause in
Article III, for example, makes it capable of inaccessibility, and
this is at least as troubling as the supernal phrases of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.29
25. Amar, supra note 5, at 258 n.169.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., COMM. ON LONG RANGE PLANNING,
PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 10 (1994) (acknowledging
the adaptability of Article rs structure to meet changing conditions of governance).
29. See Amar, supra note 5, at 214-16.
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In fact, Amar's interpretive hesitations reveal something rather
interesting about the enterprise of interpretation: it is deeply
contextualized, 0 and hence necessarily subjective, and the inter-
preter is likely to reach for whatever tools-textualist or
metatextualist-that unlock the context."' Justice Scalia stoutly
defends textualism by drawing a flattering comparison between
textualism and what he calls the "degraded" formalist technique
of strict constructionism.32 Justice Scalia's purported distinction,
however, is tendentious and merely illustrates how textualism
cannot escape context and subjectivity.33 If strict constructionism
30. Lief Carter declares in a recent essay that "[c]ontext-both the pragmatic
elements of specific problems and the moods and expectations which surround
them-powers all discourse, including constitutional discourse." Lief H. Carter,
'Clause and Effect:" An Imagined Conversation with Sanford Levinson, in CONSTITU-
TIONAL STUPIDrIES, supra note 20, at 28, 28. Carter deliberately analogizes constitu-
tional texts to steering wheels rather than engines, believing that an interpreter
hopes to turn the discourse in desired directions, and that individuals (particularly
judges) have their own desired directions. See id.
31. And where will those tools be found? If one wants to understand, for example,
the meaning of the constitutional phrase "Commerce . . . among the several States,"
a complete answer will hardly be found in other enumerating clauses of Article I. As
Steven Calabresi emphasizes, the sources available-historical, linguistic, economic,
sociopolitical-lie predominantly, though Calabresi argues necessarily, outside the
frame of the Constitution itself. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as
Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1377, 1389 & n.42 (1994); see also RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 278 (1990) (noting that textualism seeks
to avoid interpretive indeterminacy through the "high price" of discounting the "com-
municative intent" and "broader purposes" of the text). But see infra notes 48-61 and
accompanying text (describing a possible rejoinder to Calabresi enabled by Amar's
newly crafted "intratextualist" theory).
32. See Scalia, supra note 24, at 23.
33. As Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein astutely observe, the text cannot inter-
pret itself. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Adminis-
tration, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 12 (1994). Judicial presuppositions, as this Article
maintains, are an expected element of constitutional discourse. Certainly, this would
also be true-if judges actually embraced its methodology-of textualism's most com-
bustive expression, namely, deconstructionist analysis. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Tradi-
tion, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613 (1990).
In the setting of a Supreme Court review of a bitter parental custody dispute,
Balkin seeks to expose Justice Scalia's attachment to the word "tradition" as
encrypting a particular set of conservative family values. See id. at 1615-17. In do-
ing so, however, Balkin acknowledges that he needs an ultimate moral principle that
decides when the regressive exploration of meaning must stop. See id. at 1629. In
an unsatisfying conclusion, Balkin claims that he chooses to deconstruct Justice
Scalia's opinion, rather than Justice Brennan's, on the disturbingly thin critical
premise that Justice Scalia's view is "misguided." See id. at 1627. Balkin freely ad-
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is merely degraded textualism, what benchmark signals to the
strict constructionist that her reading is no longer, as Justice
Scalia demands, strict or lenient, but has now become "reason-
able?"3' The siren song of the solipsist is heard once again.35
2. Structuralism: Transcending the Text
Structuralism takes its intellectual inheritance from textu-
alism. It reflects the ideas of Professor Charles Black, who in-
spired this school of interpretation in a compact lecture series
published thirty years ago. 6 Blackian structuralism transcends
text through the process of inference; it mulls constitutional
structure and relationships in search of postulates about the
underlying design of the Constitution." The design is then pre-
served-or, in a dynamic application, enhanced-by the interpre-
tive analysis. " Black emphasizes that structural reasoning
above all has to "make sense-current, practical sense."3 9 I doubt
that any theory of interpretation could prudently reach for a
lower standard than that, but Black argues pointedly that the
mits that he is grinding a particular ideological axe. Even the supposedly neutral
practice of deconstruction, it would appear, cannot "alleviate the need for the exis-
tence of a set of political commitments that preexist the deconstructive act." Id. at
1628. As I will discuss, constitutional interpretation typically involves preinterpretive
contemplation of a desired outcome. See infra text accompanying notes 155, 159.
34. See Scalia, supra note 24, at 23.
35. Richard Posner's critique of textualist, formalist theory stresses an underlying
problem with the enterprise of interpretation. In Posner's view, the bounds of inter-
pretation could be so inherently elastic (because the process applies also to dreams,
texts in foreign languages, and musical compositions) that the results would always be
doubtful. See POSNER, supra note 18, at 400. Posner's skepticism calls to mind Robert
Nagers exquisitely ironic suggestion that those most entrusted with the meaning of
our fundamental document-the lawyers-are "by training, role, and instinct inclined
to think that it is difficult to discover meaning." ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTrTUTIONAL
CULTURES: THE MIENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (1989).
36. See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW (Ox Bow Press 1985) (1969) (presenting applied examples of a
structuralist theory).
37. See, e.g., ic. at 23 ("How might our federal constitutional law use the method
of reasoning from structure and relation?").
38. See id. at 7-8.
39. Id. at 22. Black's admonition clearly resonates with Akhil Amar in his latest
interpretive exploration. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV.
747, 752 n.22 (1999). For a discussion of intratextualism, see infra notes 48-61 and
accompanying text.
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"textual-explication method" (his term for textualism), operating
on the general language of the Constitution, contains within
itself no guarantee of making sense, "for a court may always
present itself or even see itself as being bound by the stated
intent, however nonsensical, of somebody else."'
As an avowed structuralist, having analyzed Article III of the
Constitution using the deep structure/surface structure bipolarity
of Noam Chomsky's structural linguistics,4' I offer only a mild
(but, I believe, telling) reproof of Black's methodology. In the
first place, and despite Black's specific warning, structuralism
carries the high risk of detaching itself too quickly from its tex-
tual supports and yielding to the desires of the interpreter's
political imagination." For example, Black himself infers a First
Amendment right of free expression on matters of national polit-
ical interest from the ecumenical, and demonstrably nontextual
premise of "the political relations which bind all the people who
are a part of the intercommunicating polity that is the United
States."43
40. BLACK, supra note 36, at 22. Black also believes, however, that textual and
structural methods would work together, "for the structure and relations concerned
are themselves created by the text, and inference drawn from them must surely be
controlled by the text." Id. at 29.
41. See Brian F. Havel, The Constitution in an Era of Supranational Adjudication,
78 N.C. L. REv. 257 (2000).
42. See BLACK, supra note 36, at 29 (expressing concern that the precision he
hoped for could "be supplanted by wide-open speculation").
43. Id. at 50. Black's discussion concerns the Supreme Court's analysis in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). There, the Court required a finding
of actual malice before a publication could be sued for libel by a state public official
for criticism of his official conduct. See id. at 279-80. The stated grounds for decision
were the "coaction," in Black's words, of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See
BLACK, supra note 36, at 46-47. Black proposes an alternative, structuralist rationale
for the outcome. In his view, a newspaper's criticism of an official for disobeying the
federal constitutional guarantee of racial equality is "an episode in a struggle of the
highest possible national political interest." Id. at 47. As such, it makes sense to say
that no local, that is, state, judge or jury could penalize free expression with respect
to matters of such surpassing national political interest. See id. Despite its tenuous
anchors in the text of the Constitution, Black feels his rationale to be at least as
satisfying as the due process ground actually invoked by the Court. See id.
I am grateful to my colleague, Mark Weber, for another pithy illustration of the
"detachment" problem. The underlying structure of the requirement in Article H that
the President be at least 35 years old has to do with expectations about maturity.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. By elevating the structural/political value over the
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This potentially extravagant approach prompts a second ob-
servation. No more than other formalistic theories, structuralism
cannot escape the dialectical necessity for some motivating
idea." In Black's case, his belief without any supporting text (as
he himself explicitly recognizes)4 5 is that state proscription of
speech, on a broad range of topics associated with national polit-
ical activity, should be prudentially forbidden in the name of
federalism.46 Ultimately, however, Black seems to take his theory
in the way I introduced it, as consolidating rather than replacing
the work of textual exegesis.47
3. Intratextualism: Structuralism Redivivus?
New or refurbished interpretive theories are the glass of fash-
ion in constitutional scholarship.4" For example, Amar fuses tex-
tualist and structuralist theory into a new interpretive techni-
que in which the Constitution becomes a kind of self-referential
dictionary. Words or phrases that recur in the text provide a
controlling "intratextualist" gloss on their likely meanings in
otherwise unrelated textual settings.49 Intratextualism aims to
be holistic, manipulating more than one isolated word or phrase
or clause at the same time in a directed quest for more profound
explicit text of the Constitution, this reasoning might generate the outcome that a
15-year-old who is really mature is suddenly qualified to take office as president.
44. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
45. See BLACK, supra note 36, at 95.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 94 (contending that textual analysis can be "firmed up" by struc-
turalist ideas).
48. As well as Amar's intratextualism, for example, Cass Sunstein recently has
proposed a theory of constitutional minimalism. See infra notes 114-20 and accompa-
nying t xt; see also 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) (pre-
senting a theory of constitutional moments to explain how the Constitution might be
deemed to have adopted the administrative state solely by command of the electoral
will or vox populi). See generally Gary Rosen, Triangulating the Constitution, COM-
MENTARY, July-Aug. 1999, at 59, 60 (deconstructing Ackerman's theory as a Dama-
scene conversion to conservative thinking). For a directory of recent theoretical activ-
ity, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 535, 537 n.1 (1999).
49. See generally Amar, supra note 39 (coining the term "intratextualism," an
"interpretive technique" whereby "a word or phrase [is read] in a given [constitutional]
clause by self-consciously comparing and contrasting it to identical or similar words
or phrases elsewhere in the Constitution").
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meaning.' ° It gives primacy to implicitness, which therefore
casts it as both inferential and, unsurprisingly, structuralist.
Indeed, Amar's portrayal of intratextualism as a three-dimen-
sional reading of a "two-dimensional parchment"51 suggests that
intratextualism is structuralism, a subset of Blackian theory
that creates implicit relations among apparently related textual
occurrences.
Anticipating a charge of mere replication, Amar differentiates
his focus on the words of the Constitution from what he calls the
classical structuralist attention to institutional arrangements.52
There is an intriguing conceptual byplay at work here. Amar
seems to suggest that structuralism, properly speaking, preoccu-
pies itself with the "structural" aspects of the Constitution
-theories of separate powers or of federalism, for example."
Amar's intratextualism, in contrast, allegedly transcends
structuralism's preoccupations with implicit relations and with
governmental structure. Amar implies that intratextualism is
always fully text-driven and applicable to all provisions of the
Constitution, not just the governmental structure.5 But Amar is
inaccurate in both of these arguments. First, it is hardly plausi-
ble that classical structuralism could have developed into a use-
ful theory without paying careful attention to its textual moor-
ings.55 Second, his confinement of structuralism to governmental
50. See generally id. at 749-88, 802-27 (examining landmark judicial opinions and
commentaries for "traces of [intratextualism]").
51. Id. at 788.
52. See id. at 790. As examples of institutional arrangements, Amar suggests the
relationship among the political branches, or among the states. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. I am at a loss to understand Amar's insistence that Blackian structuralists
will revert always to "institutional patterns rather than the organization of constitu-
tional text." Id. at 797 n.197. As I argue in the main text, structuralists cannot
provide useful analytical models if they never consult the small pieces of the consti-
tutional language. For example, a structuralist reads the Vesting Clauses contained
in Articles I and II of the Constitution, which refer respectively to the legislative
and executive power "of the United States," and the Vesting Clause in Article III,
which simply mentions "the judicial Power," and infers from this inconsistency (at
the very least) that the judicial power may vest in courts that are not established
explicitly under Article III (for example, state courts, administrative tribunals, or
even the more controversial species of supranational tribunals). See Havel, supra
note 41, at 305-06; supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text. The structural principle
advanced here is that the Constitution, in its deep design, envisages a potential
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theory overlooks Black's own use of structuralism in interpreting
the Bill of Rights.
56
In fact, intratextualism would be no more than a modestly
enriched textualism were it not for its structuralist pretensions.
Thus, in unconscious homage to Chomsky's structural linguis-
tics, Amar notes how intratextual word links could act as a
"surface sign of a much deeper thematic connection, a sympa-
thetic vibration evidencing a rich harmony at work.""7 For exam-
ple, the final words of the Tenth Amendment, which reserve
residual governmental powers to "the people," in Amar's view
resonate intratextually with the first words of the Pream-
ble-"We the People"-and the two passages arguably evince "a
deep pattern, embroidering the fundamental constitutional prin-
ciple of popular sovereignty.""8 Classical structuralism would
generate from precisely the same linkage a fundamental postu-
late of popular dominion over the constitutional order.5 9
In fairness, Amar is not promoting intratextualist analysis as
the New Kingdom for interpretation. Surrendering himself to
multiplicity of systems invested with judicial authority under Article III. This read-
ing is ostensibly a text-driven structuralist premise, however. Indeed, to the extent
that it reads meaning into a contrast between textual lacunae and a textual inser-
tion, it is also arguably intratextualist. As it happens, Amar is not opposed to read-
ing implicit meanings into textual lacunae. See Amar, supra note 39, at 788.
56. As Black demonstrates himself, see supra text accompanying note 43,
structuralists are just as prepared to locate their field of inquiry within the Bill of
Rights. See BLACK, supra note 36, at 50-51.
57. Amar, supra note 39, at 793. Simplifying, Noam Chomsky's original structure-
dependent language theory posits a surface structure-everyday written and spoken
language-that is generated from underlying paradigmatic phrase forms, the deep
structure of language, which each writer or speaker understands tacitly and uses to
generate potentially infinite language performances in the surface structure. See
Havel, supra note 41, at 275-77. Amar revisits his Chomskyan insight later in his
article when he remarks that "similar wording will quite often be a surface marker
of a deeper analytic insight waiting to be found upon close inspection." Amar, supra
note 39, at 798. Later still, Amar mentions that the "textual interlock" between the
First Amendment and the Necessary and Proper Clause-created by the words "Con-
gress," "shall," "make," and "law" in the same order in two places-could not be
coincidental, especially in light of the drafting history, and is in fact "part of a deep
design." Id. at 814.
58. Amar, supra note 39, at 793.
59. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2254 (1999) (demarcating the scope
of state sovereign immunity not by constitutional text alone "but by fundamental
postulates implicit in the constitutional design"). For a full analysis of Alden, see
infra notes 214-56 and accompanying text.
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forensic interpretation, he concludes diffidently that he is pro-
viding only "another set of clues" in the search for constitutional
meaning," another "standard tool in the kitbag of the capable
constitutional lawyer."6'
4. Originalism: The Framers Still Speak
a. Proto-originalism (The Framers'Actual Words)
In its pure form, originalism treats constitutional meaning as
ascertainably fixed, either by the original understanding of the
constitutional language or the "intent" of the Framers in draft-
ing that language, which arguably may be the same thing.62
Indeed, "[to an [authentic] originalist, only 'This Constitution' is
supreme law, and not what the Supreme Court has said about
it."63 This theory probably deserves its reputation for oracular
overreaching. 6' It assumes that the clauses of the Constitution
were inscribed with lapidary precision, even though the histori-
60. Amar, supra note 39, at 748. In the spirit of eclecticism, Amar finds it unsur-
prising that different interpretive techniques should "overlap and converge:" "The
various types of argument are not sealed off from each other, and ultimately they
are all mere tools to help us draw meaning from the same source-the American
Constitution in word and deed." Id. at 755 n.31. But Amar does not see this "foren-
sic" insight as itself an interpretive methodology, even though he views the tech-
niques as the foundations of conventional constitutional argument. See id. at 754.
61. Id. at 788. Curiously, Amar eventually turns on his own theoretical creation
and accuses it of being possibly "too self-referential, even autistic." Id. at 799. In
making this admission, Amar opens up a realm of what he calls "intertextualism,"
the use of other documents, such as the English Bill of Rights, state constitutions,
the Declaration of Independence, and the Articles of Confederation, in the search for
meaning. See id. No tool of interpretation, Amar reminds us, "is a magic bullet." Id.
at 801. For a new critique of Amar's theory, see Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A.
Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with lntratextualism, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 730 (2000) (treating skeptically Amar's evident confidence that there is a coher-
ence and holism in the Constitution that responds to an interpretive theory based
upon intratextualism rather than conventional clause-bound analysis).
62. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Dis-
course, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12 (1997) (providing an account of the links between
originalism and the "historicist" ideal of the rule of law, or rule by norms laid down
by legitimate lawmaking authorities prior to their application to particular cases).
63. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1155, 1213-14 (1992) (footnote omitted).
64. For a very recent, calmly paced critique that picks up the most common argu-
ments against originalism in its strict form, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 234-41.
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cal record, to the extent that it exists, reveals the perplexity and
fractiousness that lie behind much of the adopted language. 5
Thus, originalism relies on the gross simplification that it is
possible to divine a single authoritative meaning from texts that
are the collective product of large assemblies.61 Were the pro-
cess so straightforward, we would not have any difficulty, for
example, in determining whether Congress believed, as recently
as 1994, that the World Trade Organization would challenge
Congress's legislative supremacy, or the independence of the
federal courts, under the Constitution. As it turns out, the con-
gressional debates repeatedly confused the separate ideas of
sovereignty and constitutionality and provided little more than
rhetorical heat about America's readiness to accommodate su-
pranational institutions within its constitutional system.67 Still
65. See Jack N. Rakov% Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause
as a Case Study, I PERSP. AM. HIST. (n.s.) 233, 281 (1984). Richard Posner, agreeing,
dismisses intentionalism, particularly the extraction of a "single unifying intention or
theme," as fantasy, the belief of denizens of "cloud-cuckoo-land." POSNER, supra note
18, at 179. None of this is to disparage Robert Clinton's argument that a clear origi-
nal understanding, if it can be demonstrated, should bind the discretion of later
courts. See Clinton, supra note 3, at 748 n.11. But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of
Legislative Courts, Administratiue Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 916,
944-45 & n.176 (1988) (arguing that a "specific intent" of the Framers, a relatively
precise identification of intent, could control the outcomes of particular kinds of
cases, but that an "abstract intent," defined at a higher generality-such as the Su-
preme Court's equal protection jurisprudence-might entail consequences that the
drafters scarcely considered and might even have rejected). Even granting the sound-
ness of Clinton's premise that originally intended meaning should not be shifted
arbitrarily, his argument goes more to the persuasiveness of originalism in specific
contexts rather than to its potency as a general theory of interpretation.
66. Jack Rakove launches his study of the Constitution's history with a compre-
hensive assault on the originalist pretense of uniformity. Rakove draws special at-
tention to the Constitution's array of iconic words and brief phrases that lack any
"explanatory footnotes or midrashic columns." RAKOVE, supra note 7, at 11-12. Thus,
in contrast to the juristic bias that sees the Constitution as "an advanced seminar
in constitutional theory, historians and many political scientists [see a] cumulative
process of bargaining and compromise in which a rigid adherence to principle
yield[s] to the pragmatic tests of reaching agreement and building coalitions." Id. at
15; see infra note 68 (giving an example of the difficulty of clear readings of the
Framers' intent); see also POSNER, supra note 31, at 295 (maintaining that the idea
of a "group mind" is a fiction, so that there can be "no 'legislative intent! in a literal
sense"); Sinnott-Armstrong & Brison, supra note 6, at 1, 9 (discussing the compli-
cated task of fixing meaning when intention is so diffuse).
67. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. S19,488 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1994) (statement of Sen.
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less can we posit the shared corporate view of a body of men
meeting in a conclave over two hundred years ago.68 The enter-
prise of originalism may not even be much good as history, if
one compares it to the exacting standards of professional histori-
ans. As processed through our court system, originalist history
tends to be, in Stephen Griffin's adroit phrase, "law-office history,"
compiled to meet the very different selectivity standards of com-
mon law advocacy. 69 The Supreme Court itself, by the candid
admission of one of its current Justices, has not fared any better
in the scrupulousness of its historical analysis.70
For all of this powerful criticism, originalism, in its hunt for a
discoverable "Ur-Constitution" (the original understanding),
continues to inspire some legal theorists in the way that recon-
struction of a proto-Indo-European language still inspires some
historical linguists.7' But the linguists' project is self-contained;
Helms) (portraying the World Trade Organization as a "United Nations for world
trade, combined with a world court," and, therefore, "a potential assault on the sov-
ereignty of the United States of America"). The Constitution of the United States,
incidentally, never uses the word "sovereignty." See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,
2270 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).
68. See RAKOVE, supra note 7, at xv (noting real problems in reconstructing coher-
ent intentions and understandings from evidence of history); Gene R. Nichol, Justice
Scalia and the Printz Case: The Trials of an Occasional Originalist, 70 U. COLO. L.
REv. 953, 968 (1999). In an earlier study, Rakove examines the difficulty of estab-
lishing an originalist reading of the role of the President in foreign policy. For in-
stance, why did the President eventually share in the treaty-making authority that
was initially the Senate's role exclusively? Was the President seen pragmatically as
a more useful agent for the conduct of diplomacy or-in an almost metaphysical
way-as the republican magistrate charged with defense and the assertion of a
broader national interest? See Rakove, supra note 65, at 235, 280. The striking as-
pect of historian Rakove's investigation is the paucity of information, what Rakove
calls a "seemingly muddled set of references," especially as to the rationale (or "edi-
torial quirk") that placed the treaty power within the executive Article-Article II.
Id. at 267, 279. Rakove arrives at a metatextual resolution that the Framers may
have permitted a "constructive ambiguity" that would allow later Presidents to ex-
plore how much flexibility they might have. Id. at 276.
69. GRIFFIN, supra note 15, at 164.
70. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2273 n.8 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("IT]hat an
assertion of historical fact has been made by a Justice of the Court does not make
it so."). The Alden case, as explained below, illustrates how an ambiguous and some-
what frayed historical record, filtered through the brief-writing and opinion-writing
conventions of the common law, produces arguments that each side of the issue can
legitimately accept as persuasive. See infra notes 214-56 and accompanying text.
71. See generally LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICA-
2000] FORENSIC CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
in rebuilding the common source language of the Indo-European
peoples, they seek neither to describe the many descendent lan-
guages nor prescriptively to reform them. In contrast, strict
originalists look upon the Ur-Constitution as normatively more
authentic and more binding than today's evolved constitutional
culture.72 Linguists are also using objective pieces of linguistic
evidence in their task; centuries of consonant-shifting patterns
and related vocabulary choices can be traced and documented
without ideological predisposition.7" Can the originalists, in their
interpretive task, lay claim to a comparable scientific detach-
ment? Given the fragile historical record, can they be sure, as
Richard Fallon asks, that they have excluded their "assump-
tions, values, and goals," or the "assumptions, values, and goals
of an interpretive community?" 74 For historical linguistics, ret-
rospection defines the field of inquiry. For originalism, as a
method of historical interpretation, retrospection may be a seri-
ous disadvantage. When a document is designed for futurity, as
the Constitution evidently was designed,75 unyielding reversion
to historical experience could even be condemned as interpretive
solecism.76
TION 301-13 (Adrian Akmajian et al. eds., 4th ed. 1995) [hereinafter LINGUISTIcS]
(describing reconstruction of putative Indo-European ancestor language).
72. Cf Scalia, supra note 24, at 3, 17, 21.
73. See LINGUISTICS, supra note 71, at 307-09 (describing, inter alia, Grimm's Law
of consonantal correspondences).
74. Fallon, supra note 62, at 13; see also NAGEL, supra note 35, at 8 (noting the
dangers of relativism and solipsism in originalist analysis); Lessig & Sunstein, supra
note 33, at 12 (observing that "the presuppositions with which we begin will color
our reading of the words, possibly more than they illuminate the world the words
were meant to construct"); David A. Strauss, Tragedies Under the Common Law
Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, supra note 20, at 235, 235 (emphasiz-
ing the danger of attributing the modern interpreter's political, moral, or ideological
assumptions to the Framers).
75. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 34, at 207 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (anticipating that the Constitution would have to serve the unknowable
needs of a "remote futurity").
76. See Michael L. Wells & Edward J. Larson, Original Intent and Article III, 70
TUL. L. REV. 75, 94 (1995) (concluding that "originalism is less attractive when
changes in society render the decisions made, and the considerations that con-
tributed to those decisions, irrelevant to modern conditions").
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b. Neo-originalism (The Framers'Actual Words, Translated)
A currently prominent neo-originalist theory shows Fallon's
skepticism to have been warranted. In a recent article, Lawrence
Lessig and Cass Sunstein seem to be hiding their essentially
purposive reading behind an originalist scrim. These authors
argue that constitutional interpretation must be preeminently a
matter of "fidelity" to the commitments of the Framers. That is
surely an originalist premise, but begs the usual normative
question about why courts should practice fidelity to a diffuse
and questionably relevant history. Recognizing, therefore, that
fidelity may be context insensitive, Lessig and Sunstein propose
"a practice of translation" that purports to respect the "values" of
the Framers' original design but would also track changes in
context.7' Reading the Commerce Clause, for example, they
would "translate" the Framers' vision of a narrow national com-
merce power into a twentieth-century economic context. Fidelity,
in this conversion process, would not require the Supreme Court
to understand the twentieth-century Commerce Clause "to ex-
tend no further than the framers believed in the eighteenth
[century]."79 The original purpose of the clause was to ensure
that the national government could reach all interstate com-
merce, as it then existed; "[iun these circumstances, fidelity to the
original design entitle[s] the Court to understand the clause
quite differently from the way the framing generation had un-
derstood it.""0
As Lessig and Sunstein appear to concede, however, some-
times translation fails to meld quite so expediently with the
text. For example, the First Amendment applies literally only to
Congress. Its modern application to the executive is a function of
the executive's role as a principal national lawmaker.81 The
eighteenth century saw Congress in that role exclusively; there-
fore, Lessig and Sunstein deduce, to maintain fidelity to the
original design of ensuring against intrusion on speech by na-
77. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 33, at 86.
78. See id. at 88.
79. Id. at 89.
80. Id. at 90.
81. See id. at 91.
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tional institutions endowed with lawmaking power, the First
Amendment must be translated to include the modern execu-
tive. 2 Unlike the Commerce Clause example, however, the
translation here does not infuse the literal text with an enriched
meaning derived from changed circumstances external to the
Constitution. Rather, Lessig and Sunstein are superimposing a
metatext that (I can suppose) would be expressed in a require-
ment that "the term Congress shall mean any national institu-
tion endowed with lawmaking power, including the executive."
3
The authors recognize the potential for abuse and for capricious
interpretation in this methodology.8 Their only controlling de-
vice is the duty of fidelity, the assumption that the Constitution
would not take on "values that are not fairly traceable to found-
ing commitments." 5 Given the common law's institutional bias
toward selective evidence, and the relativistic biases of modern
interpreters, however, one might question whether Lessig and
Sunstein's formula could be anything more than a clever seman-
tic reconfiguration of existing nonoriginalist interpretive prac-
tice.
In another article, for example, I attempt what Lessig and
Sunstein might describe as a "translation" of the Foreign Com-
merce Clause that relies pivotally on the "value" the Framers
ascribed to centralized regulation of the nation's external
trade. 6 That article has no explicitly originalist ambitions, how-
ever; it is a frank exercise in interpreting the Constitution for
the era of global commerce, using originalist/historicist ideas as
one part of a larger interpretive composition. 7 Nevertheless, my
approach seems broadly consistent with Lessig's and Sunstein's
formulation that "[a]pplications of the constitutional require-
ments may change, not because [some] underlying values
change, but because our understanding of how best to imple-
ment those values changes, making mechanical adherence to old
82. See id.
83. See id. at 93.
84. See id. at 106.
85. Id. at 93.
86. See Havel, supra note 41.
87. Thus, the article also reflects structuralist ideas. See id.
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understandings inconsistent with fidelity."88 Fidelity is what
"we" say it is, in other words.89
B. Substantive Prescriptivism
1. Vaulting Ambition: Dworkin and Posner
It has been suggested that the formalistic theories "pride
themselves on reaching results that the interpreter laments,
often strongly." ° The decision-making process is thought to be
external to the interpreter, so that judges with different value
systems will reason inexorably to the same result.9' It is illusory,
however, to assume that any of these theories combined-let
alone on their own-could bend the will of a reluctant interpreter.
The availability of multiple interpretive methodologies-forensic
interpretation-protects judges from being forced into what they
might perceive as suboptimal outcomes. Moreover, as discussed
further in Part II, judges in constitutional law cases are never
engaged in outcome-blind formalism. Their readings, however
88. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 33, at 93.
89. Terrance Sandalow would likely count the translation conceit as another in-
stance of how present values come to "dominate those of the past." Terrance
Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1048 (1981). In par-
ticular, the narrow view that the Framers had of federal power under the Commerce
Clause leads Sandalow to conclude-without originalist contumely, it should be noted
-that "[w]hen the IFiramers' intentions are placed in perspective, it is apparent
that attribution of the contemporary law of the [C]ommerce [Cilause to them is
chimerical." Id. at 1049. In a similar critical vein, Griffin argues that "counterfactual
speculation," which the translation method inevitably requires, "does not change the
fact that we, not the Framers, are carrying out the translation." GRIFFIN, supra note
15, at 185; see also POSNER, supra note 31, at 275 (accusing originalists of making
absurdly large assumptions about the minds of the Framers, educated and experi-
enced in vastly different times, and their capacity to decide a question arising today
"if they knew what we know;" historic situations made the exercise "impossible not
only in practice but in theory"). Mark Tushnet holds just as skeptical a view of
originalist ambitions, commenting that he has "little doubt that an ingenious analyst
could almost always come up with a clever account of [the Framers'] intentions ...
that demonstrated how any constitutional provision that hung in for long enough
was successful." Mark Tushnet, Returning with Interest: Observations on Some Puta-
tive Benefits of Studying Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 325,
329 (1998).
90. Eskridge & Levinson, supra note 20, at 6.
91. See id. at 6; see also supra text accompanying note 19 (discussing "positivist"
methodology).
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veiled in methodology, are typically purposive. It is hardly sur-
prising, therefore, that some scholars have sought to transcend
formalistic hermeneutic devices and to influence the judges
toward an outcome that is conditioned overtly and explicitly by
political or moral theory.9 2 These theories of "substantive trans-
formation," as Richard Epstein might call them,93 encroach on
perilous jurisprudential territory. They aim to reorient the
judge's primary discourse from the purportedly interpretive task
at hand to the metalegal factors that help frame the judge's
initial sense of outcome. 94 In Epstein's estimation, open-ended
invocations of justice and social policy95 "create the greatest
sense of unease."96
Substantive prescriptivist theories are also awkward for judges
to apply. To dwell obsessively on one's desired moral or political
result will serve only to drain potency from a judicial opinion.
The judge becomes caught once again in the trap of solipsism.
As Richard Posner has himself coyly observed, it is an easy
92. See Fallon, supra note 48, at 538.
93. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Common Lawyer Looks at Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 72 B.U. L. REV. 699, 703 (1992) (disparaging theories that are, in effect,
front-loaded to "win through interpretation what was lost in the initial drafting").
94. John Hart Ely believes that the values adopted would normally be those "of
the upper-middle, professional class from which most lawyers and judges, and for
that matter most philosophers, are drawn." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dis-
TRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEV 59 (1980). But see Richard A. Posner, Prag-
matic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1996) (describing judges of federal
courts, precisely because of their social standing and educational attainments, as
"councils of wise elders" in whom it is not "insane to entrust . . . responsibility for
deciding cases").
95. For example, Ronald Dworkin's theory of law as integrity comes to mind. See
RONALD DwORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 164-66 (1986) (explaining integrity in constitutional
interpretation, inter alia, as a political ideal that a government must "act on a sin-
gle, coherent set of principles even when its citizens are divided about what the
right principles of justice and fairness really are").
96. Epstein, supra note 93, at 700. One branch of theoretical scholarship, which
can be identified broadly as constitutional skepticism, treats the Constitution as
normatively contingent, a reflection of a particular societal tradition that excludes
certain liberal, progressive, or even conservative perspectives. The Constitution's
apparent exaltation of an atomistic, individualistic right to vote, for example, has
been challenged by scholars seeking a more transcendent collective protection for
wider group interests. See Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting
Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287 (1996). For a powerful feminist
critique of the Bill of Rights, see Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs
and the Bill of "Rights".• A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453 (1992).
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matter "to confuse one's strong policy preferences with the
law. "
97
a. Dworkin's Moral Principles: A Herculean Idea
Dworkin may be the most influential transformational ju-
rist/philosopher, but I confess to a certain wariness of his self-
conscious search for determinative moral precepts of adjudica-
tion. When Dworkin imagines an "abstract egalitarian princi-
ple," for example, and uses it to suggest that citizens are enti-
tled to equal treatment and concern on the part of the political
decision makers in the government, 98 is he interpreting the actual
Constitution of the United States or projecting the outline of a
shadow Constitution, an unrealized reticulation of rights and
duties that the Constitution would have explicitly contained, had
the Framers been prescient enough to conceive of it?99 Dworkin's
most arresting interpretive figure-a surrogate of surpassing
judicial insight and intellectual power he names Hercules-can
reason with the complacency of Pangloss that the Constitution
must yield "the best available interpretation of American consti-
tutional text and practice as a whole," but with an acute sensi-
tivity to "the great complexity of political virtues bearing on that
issue."' One has the uneasy sense that Dworkin wants to build
a grand stage for constitutional analysis, while engaged in a fu-
tile quest for worthy judicial players to occupy it. After all, Her-
cules is an overwrought figure-maybe even a buccaneer, as
Dworkin himself admits.' °' But what of the poorer players, the
97. POSNER, supra note 18, at 402; see also Tribe, supra note 14, at 71-72 (warn-
ing against descending into personal preferences in the guise of constitutional exege-
sis, while advocating a "forthright account, incomplete and inconclusive though it
might be, of why one deems his or her proposed construction of the text to be wor-
thy of acceptance, in light of the Constitution as a whole and the history of its
interpretation").
98. DWORKIN, supra note 95, at 382.
99. See Larry Alexander, Constitutional Tragedies and Giving Refuge to the Devil,
in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDrTIES, supra note 20, at 115, 117 (accusing Dworkinian
strategies of "cut[ting] a great road through the law,'" so that what might appear as
a "forest of rules"--the Constitution-is actually "an open field" (quoting ROBERT
BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS: A PLAY IN TWO AcTS 66 (1962))).
100. DWORKIN, supra note 95, at 398.
101. See id. at 397.
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less cosmically gifted judges, who must strut and fret their hour
upon Dworkin's stage?
1 2
b. Posner's New Pragmatism
Despite Richard Posner's disdain for solipsistic interpreta-
tion,0 3 he proposes a normative theory-pragmatism-that tries
to incite judges, instead of submitting obediently "to the framers'
every metronome marking," to treat the interpretive process as
"the empathic projection of the judge's mind and talent into the
creative souls of the framers."1°4 Posnerian pragmatism, howev-
er, is not solely an attempt to be more honest about retrospec-
tive mutations of the Framers' design than formalist tactics like
originalism or neo-originalism. Posner also seeks candor concern-
ing the purposiveness of judicial decision making. 0 5 Instead of
sneak peeks at consequences, a pragmatist judge would place
the consequences of her decision at the core of her enterprise. 6
For Posner, that means judges ought to use the process of law
pragmatically, as "an instrument for social ends."0 7
Posner's dislike of formalist conceptualism is troubling, be-
cause it tends to regard all legal concepts-even mundane dog-
mas like contract-as inherently contingent and subservient to
the practices of the nonlegal community and susceptible to being
discarded almost at will. 0 8 Posner seems to assume, therefore,
that formal legal categories are almost always, in some ontologi-
102. For the source of the metaphor, see WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5,
sc. 5. Nevertheless, the search for integrity in reasoning that Dworkin champi-
ons-whether that is a moral postulate or more prosaically a warning that precedent
must not be overthrown lightly on dogmatic political premises-is a salutary one if
the judicial power is to be respected. See supra note 95 (explaining the notion of
integrity in constitutional analysis).
103. Pbsner's distrust of the solipsism that grounds his pragmatic theory should be
understood as an ironic commentary on the whole hermeneutic enterprise, whatever
its methodologies. Indeed, Posner usps pragmatism primarily to subvert what he sees
as the habitual bias of lawyers, but also of academics, that interpretation can mas-
querade as a truly objective technique, and that "demonstrably correct rather than
merely plausible or reasonable answers to most legal questions" are to be found in
authoritative texts. POSNER, supra note 18, at 20.
104. Id. at 253.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 405.
108. See id. at 399.
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cal way, a bad fit. He does not want to consider why the re-
quired activist outcome could not be achieved more congenially
-and with the virtue of stability-within conventional legal
discourse. Pragmatism, in other words, is an excuse for naked
judicial creativity, but is coded as empathic projection.'0 9 Posner
is not oblivious to the importance of forensic technique, however.
He recognizes the ever-present possibility that "some strand of
formalist legal discourse," whether textualism or simple reliance
on precedent, could be justified pragmatically as "the best guide
to judicial decision-making.""' In an oil and gas controversy, for
example, he would have judges inquire into the "right," "sensi-
ble," "socially apt," "reasonable," and "efficient" rule for oil and
gas."' Thereafter, Hercules having spoken, the institutional
conventions of the common law-cases, statutes, doctrine-could
be adjusted to fit the judge's sense of empirical rightness."
If Posner is saying that judges are, or should be, inspired by
an initiating idea or desired outcome, then his theory is surely
correct, but hardly subversive. Posner, like Dworkin, undoubtedly
hopes for a more ambitious view of the law's normative capa-
bility. In fact, both of these transformativists seek to make ex-
plicit what might otherwise be implicit in the practice of consti-
tutional law. They would expect judges to self-consciously and
explicitly apply a preference for a socially ameliorative or rights-
enhancing rule, a political or moral taking of sides that in con-
stitutional analysis has traditionally outpaced the ambition of
the unelected branch.
109. See id. To emphasize the tentativeness of interpretive practice, Posner claims
also to regard all of the constitutional text, with its overlay of judicial exposition, as
"not a directive but a resource [for] further interpretive ventures." Id. at 207. Thus,
he discounts any clairvoyance on the part of the Framers, despite much civic piety
driving the contrary view, and declares their work product "inscrutable with respect
to most modem problems," and, moreover, "overlaid by hundreds of thousands of
pages of judicial interpretation." Id.
110. Id. at 401.
111. Id. at 399.
112. See id. at 398-99. This, no doubt, is what Posner means when he writes that
pragmatism "reverses the sequence" of formalism, which typically inquires into the
relation between concepts, with only a "superficial examination of their relation to
the world of fact." Id.
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2. Restraining Ambition: Sunstein's Prescriptivist Minimalism
The great aspiration of Dworkin and Posner-to install a value-
based normativeness at the center of constitutional method
1 13
-runs the risk of politicizing the judiciary beyond its inherently
confined role of interpretation. In this sense, interpretation is
not the pastime of empyrean tribunals; its persuasiveness and
authority are not radiated from the sun-god luminosity of our
judges, but from the ordinary judicial skill needed to articulate
reasoned opinions within the boundaries of convention and pre-
cedent. To deepen this critical understanding of the forensic
method, and to prepare for its theoretical articulation in Parts II
and III, this Part closes with what I perceive to be a construct,
rather than a full-blown theory of interpretation, that recently
has been the subject of a book-length treatment by Cass
Sunstein." As a substantive prescriptivist,"5 Sunstein might be
said to advocate a certain kind of judicial humility, a perception
that judges ought themselves to be aware (and, in Sunstein's
experience, are aware) that they are poorly suited to, or trained
for, the art of grandiloquent theorizing.1 Furthermore, Sunstein
113. See DWORKIN, supra note 95; POSNER, supra note 18.
114. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8. Sunstein's book, however, is the culmination of a
process of thinking that he has been going through for some time. See, e.g., CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996); Cass R. Sunstein,
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996).
115. Sunstein's theory, which is steeped in the methodology of the common law,
straddles a line between methodological and substantive prescriptivism-as does the
forensic method considered in this Article. I classify Sunstein as a substantive
prescriptivist because of the primacy of the "theorizing" function in his assessment of
judicial interpretation of the Constitution. Admittedly, his view of theorizing is in-
tended to be limited and incremental, but it is no less present in Sunstein's con-
struct as a judicial activity than in the more substantively ambitious systems of
Dworkin and Posner. Indeed, Sunstein explicitly identifies an agreed core of value-
based ideals in the American constitutional culture, arguing that their existence
facilitates the kind of unambitious theorizing he favors. See infra note 120 (summa-
rizing Sunstein's core ideals).
116. A court that observes Sunstein's theory "is alert to the existence of reasonable
disagreement in a heterogeneous society. It knows that there is much that it does
not know; it is intensely aware of its own limitations. It seeks to decide cases on
narrow grounds. It avoids clear rules and final resolutions." SUNSTEIN, supra note 8,
at ix. Most significantly, perhaps, "[t]o the extent that it can, it seeks to provide
rulings that can attract support from people with diverse theoretical commitments."
Id. at 7
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imposes this theoretical restraint on both methodological and
substantive prescriptivism. For example, strict originalism
would be entirely too excessive-too buccaneering, in fact-for
judges who might share Sunstein's ideal of self-suppression. 117
Consequently, the work of judges should proceed according to
what Sunstein cleverly labels "incompletely theorized agree-
ments ,"118 marked by a cautious incrementalism-minimalism is
Sunstein's buzzword" 9-rooted in the case at hand and leery of
enunciations of high principle. 120
If minimalism seems like yet another abstract reformulation
of the common law method, it probably is.' 21 In closing out this
discussion of monotheistic theorizing, however, Sunstein's ap-
proach is instructive for two reasons. First, it supplies an impor-
tant prescriptive rationale for the idea that no theory should
acquire supervening importance; because judges lack complete
information on outcomes and consequences, 22 a "general ap-
117. See id.
118. Id. at 13.
119. See id. at 4 (introducing decisional minimalism).
120. See id. at 13-14. In Sunstein's construct, incompletely theorized agreements
would allow judges to decide cases without a deep-and presumably divi-
sive-analysis of ultimate meanings. Judges who differ in their accounts of what the
equality principle requires, for example, might coalesce around a "conceptual descent"
to an understanding that women, at all events, should not be excluded from pro-
fessions. Id. at 13-14 (emphasis omitted). The avoidance of first principles is at least
partly possible, Sunstein contends, because at century's end the American constitu-
tional culture has already organized itself around a well-developed core of agreement
about its ruling ideals. See id. at 63-68 (naming, among these core ideals, the rights
to engage in political dissent, to be free from discrimination on grounds of religion,
to be protected against police mistreatment, to be ruled by laws that have "a degree
of clarity," to have access to the court system to ensure that laws have been applied
accurately, and to be free from sex-based or race-based subordination (emphasis
omitted)).
121. Sunstein himself concedes early on this very point. See id. at xiii (noting that
the common law offers broad rulings only rarely, "when the time seems right").
122. Sunstein offers intriguing empirical support for this assertion, based on com-
puter-driven experiments to test people's capacity to engage in successful social engi-
neering. The experiments proved repeatedly the failure of even the most highly edu-
cated participants to pick up "complex, systemwide effects of particular interven-
tions." Id. at 52. One is reminded of the malign effects on the Clinton Presidency of
the Supreme Court's judgment in Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 702 (1997) (finding
that past experience showed that a "deluge" of civil litigation would be unlikely to
swamp the Presidency or occupy a substantial amount of the President's time if the
defendant were permitted to pursue her federal civil rights and state torts claims
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proach to constitutional law," whether methodological or sub-
stantive, is unlikely to command enduring relevance or suc-
cess. 12 Second, Sunstein's construct recognizes important limits
to the theoretical ambition of the substantive prescriptivists,
who have had an implicit tendency to see the Supreme Court as
the summum bonum in American life and government."M Lower-
level reasoning, like the "insistently analogical... character" of
the common law, requires much less ambition but is more likely
to garner broader acceptance. 125 Occasionally, the Supreme
Court will make what Sunstein styles a "conceptual ascent,"2 6
stabilizing haphazard doctrinal developments in the form of a
bellwether principle. 27 That is simply not the stuff of daily law,
however, either in the Supreme Court or among less august
franchises.
II. RATIONALIZING CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE
FORENSIC METHOD
A. The Power of Eclecticism
If one assumes the validity of the critiques of methodological
and substantive theory in Part I, the terrain of constitutional
analysis begins to look quite bleak. But think of how judges
actually behave. One need not employ a theory of interpretive
against the President during his incumbency, in fact, testimony offered in the under-
lying lawsuit contributed directly to the impeachment and trial of the President in
1998 and 1999).
123. SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 40.
124. See id. at 245-47 (describing how prescriptivists like Ronald Dworkin perceive
the Supreme Court as the "forum of principle" among American institutions).
125. Id. at 249. Thus, Sunstein provides several alternative, more tightly drawn,
rationales for the majority's strained opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See id. at 251-52.
126. Id. at 250, 257-58.
127. First-year civil procedure students experience this atypical conceptual spectacle
when they read Justice Stone's opinion in International Shoe Co. v.- Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945), the canonical reading of modem personal jurisdiction. Justice
Stone's integrative analysis undoubtedly satisfies David Strauss's postulate that,
under the common law method, "an innovation in doctrine is permissible if it is the
product of an evolutionary trend and is supported by good arguments of policy or
fairness." David A. Strauss, What Is Constitutional Theory?, 87 CAL. L. REV. 581,
585 (1999).
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absolutism, for example, in order to accept that a proper object
of Congress's commerce power might include authorizing supra-
national tribunals, constituted outside the Judiciary Article of
the Constitution, to adjudicate certain kinds of international
trade disputes. 12  An objective as specifically drawn as this
might well be a plausible fit within the range of general objec-
tives contemplated expressly by the Constitution, here the objec-
tive of furthering foreign commerce. 121 If a general objective has
been clarified, therefore, the interpretive task becomes one of
marshaling enough jurisprudential support to explain the deduc-
tion of the specific from the general. 3 ° To achieve that purpose,
a judge need not feel trammeled by an authoritarian interpretive
theory. Indeed, it is surprising how theoretical absolutists, par-
ticularly formalists, fail to understand constitutional interpreta-
tion as part of the common law tradition, a tradition that prizes
eclecticism as the governing rubric of its legal analysis.
In defining forensic interpretation through eclecticism, two
different, but ultimately convergent meanings come to mind. The
first is the meaning that David Strauss and Richard Epstein
choose as the premise of their theories of common law constitu-
tional interpretation,' 3 ' namely, that the exposition of the Con-
stitution has a tortlike or contract-like history, the composite prod-
uct of precedent, analogy, canons of construction, long-settled
principles, selective overruling, and respect for the work of one's
predecessors. 3 2 As Richard Fallon argues, the rule of law in con-
128. See Havel, supra note 41, at 260. An example would be the trade tribunals
established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, particularly if ac-
cess to those tribunals were opened up to nongovernmental organizations and private
litigants. See id. at 271 n.42.
129. Thus, there is a specific congressional power in Article I of the Constitution
"[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
130. In the case of supranational tribunals, for example, forensic interpretation
would also rely on a structuralist argument drawn from the Judiciary Article's fail-
ure to privilege an exclusive forum for federal lawsuits, and the Supreme Court's
extensive public rights jurisprudence. See Havel, supra note 41, at 290, 313.
131. See Epstein, supra note 93; David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 877 (1996).
132. On the role of precedent and analogy in constitutional law reasoning, see
SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 42-45 (arguing that, in the absence of a "comprehensive
rationality," judges, like humans generally, are more likely to gravitate toward rea-
soning by reference to prototypical cases). For a comprehensive exposition of common
1274
20001 FORENSIC CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1275
stitutional analysis demands that courts exhibit a "reasoned
elaboration of the connection between recognized, preexisting
sources of legal authority and the determination of rights and
responsibilities in particular cases."'33 The text, structure, and
history of the Constitution may "stand in the deep background"
in these circumstances, with the central argument focused on
the interpretation of judicial precedent and doctrinal principle,
"within the conventions of constitutional [common law] dis-
course."" The rule of law, in this setting, "demand[s] respect for
precedent."'35 As Bruce Ackerman emphasizes, the doctrinal
patterns formed by specific cases eventually acquire an impor-
law reasoning, see MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW
(1988). To Eisenberg, the common law is more than the sum of what he calls its
"institutional principles of adjudication," the technical devices mentioned in the main
text. Id. at 151. In his view, the systemic legitimacy of the common law is also the
result of intrinsic values of objectivity, impartiality, faithfulness to a central tradi-
tion, doctrinal stability (although not doctrinal certainty), replicability, and respon-
siveness. See id. at 8-13, 158-59. In the present context, the congruent values of
replicability and responsiveness are especially pertinent. A replicable system means
that lawyers can discover and imitate the judiciary's process of legal reasoning, al-
lowing them to counsel clients effectively without necessary resort to expensive legal
proceedings. See id. at 10-11. A responsive system, on the other hand, is one where
the judges "attend to the professional discourse" of the lawyers, most often in the
context of particular cases. Id. at 12. For forensic constitutional interpretation,
replicability and responsiveness are more than transforming marks of legitimacy: the
raison d'6tre of the forensic method is that the opinions of judges reproduce the
reasoning processes they encounter in the oral and written submissions of the law-
yers. As Eisenberg concludes, the replicability principle, in particular, grants some
assurance that courts will not feel at liberty to invoke or invent moral or political
norms that contrast with established reasoning and the expectations of the legal pro-
fession. See id. at 150-51.
133. Fallon, supra note 62, at 18.
134. Id. at 31.
135. Id. at 25; see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854, 867-68 (1992)
(noting that "the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution re-
quires . .. continuity over time" and that the Court must adhere to precedent to
maintain "solidarity" with people who struggle to accept a decision with which they
disagree out of respect for the rule of law). The argument is age-old. Former Irish
president Mary Robinson, herself a Harvard-trained constitutional lawyer, writes of
the "tricky juristic knack" that constitutions must acquire "of keeping their old
words and apparently antiquated phrases in constant touch with the spirit of succes-
sive ages." Mary Robinson, Constitutional Shifts in Europe and the United States:
Learning from Each Other, 32 STAN. J. INTL L. 1, 5 (1996). The processes for doing
so include "formal amendment, legislative action and [most importantly in the pres-
ent context] imaginative judicial interpretation." Id.
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tance that may exceed the abstractness of the original consti-
tutional expression. 136 Moreover, respect for all of the canons of
common law reasoning is entirely rational; 3 7 the system of legis-
lative and administrative courts, to take an important example,
could be undone under the letter of Article III were it not for
"[tihe massive weight of two hundred years of legislative and
judicial precedent."38
Eclecticism also explains how forensic interpretation treats
the hermeneutic methodologies considered in Part I. In this
second iteration, forensic method comprises a kind of common
law sweep of all of the various interpretive methodologies in
search of a meaning that legitimately contains and accommo-
dates a desired outcome. This is the polytheistic approach to
constitutional analysis, a method that uses multiple interpretive
techniques-textual parsing, historical sources, precedent, prag-
matic functionalism, 139 divination of the structural implications
of the constitutional design, arguments of public policy, and
136. See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 48, at 290.
137. See Amar, supra note 5, at 207 n.7 (arguing that, if the pressure of the past
is hard enough, it does and must have the power to shape the Constitution; some
such rules exist in every mature and efficient legal system and have an acknowl-
edged core of power); see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (recognizing that "no judicial
system could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised
it .... [Tihe very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution re-
quires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indis-
pensable"). Still, articles are written that seem to treat the interpretive work of the
Framers' successors, judicial and scholarly, as misbegotten. See John Harrison, The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article
III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 204 (1997) ("Focusing on the language of the Constitu-
tion, and ignoring as much as possible the gloss that has developed, this article de-
fends the traditional view that Congress's authority is substantial."). But see Michael
C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 593, 611 (1999)
(suggesting that even "the most reactionary" members of the present Supreme Court
would not challenge Marshall Court decisions-such as the legitimacy of a federal
bank-that read the Commerce Clause more expansively than the Framers might
have expected; no reason external to constitutional practice would explain this bow
to precedent, yet the result is "incontestable" to any participant in the practice).
138. Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative
Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 239, 262 (1990) (commenting that the
Supreme Court has been unable to develop a coherent theory to explain the exis-
tence of legislative and administrative courts, revealing a discrepancy between the
existing institutional architecture and the constitutional design).
139. For an explanation of pragmatic functionalism, see infra note 183.
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arguments of American ethical and legal tradition'"-° all pressed
into service either as complements of, or substitutes for, one
another in a generous forensic method. 4 ' Charles Black might
have called this "the heart-method" of the Anglo-American com-
mon law.142 In a Posnerian sense, forensic interpretation avoids
a purely formalistic response to the difficult questions of the
Constitution, while recognizing, pace Posner, that there are
iconic conceptualizations in the Constitution-for example, for-
eign commerce, judicial power, the treaty" 3-that make formal-
istic analysis, including inquiry into "the relation between con-
cepts,"'" a critical element of any coherent, even instrumental,
analysis. 4 s Finally, from a pragmatic functionalist or purposive
140. See Amar, supra note 39, at 748 (listing interpretive methodologies).
141. Thus, forensic interpretation allows for what Robert Nagel calls "the simul-
taneous utilization of various sources." NAGEL, supra note 35, at 130. It is, accord-
ingly, consensus-oriented. As David Strauss has emphasized recently, a constitutional
theory is "an exercise in justification," and the forensic method extracts from each
theory the propositions that command the most 'justificatory" agreement in the legal
culture. In this light, of course, "the Framers' intentions count for something," but
so, too, does precedent and textual explication. Strauss, supra note 127, at 582-83;
see also GRIFFIN, supra note 15, at 146-47, 151 (describing the Supreme Court's pre-
ferred use of multiple methods as a "pluralistic" method of constitutional interpreta-
tion, while noting that an obsessive attention to the impact of specific theories on
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment has
prevented a more broadly engineered approach from receiving much scholarly atten-
tion).
142. See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 36, at 4 (writing specifically about the Anglo-
American system of legal reasoning based on precedent). Richard Epstein regards the
"rich profusion" of interpretive devices as a weakness, not a strength, because it
gives the judge "freedom to reach virtually any result by stressing that single factor
that points most clearly to the outcome that the judge desires." Epstein, supra note
93, at 702. The common law, however, controls for this alleged excess-if that is
how Epstein would have it-through mechanisms such as distinguishing earlier cases,
identification and separation of dicta, outright reversal, and other well-understood
devices for modulating doctrinal history. Moreover, as discussed in the main text,
decisions must not only have rationality-they must persuade.
143. Justice Frankfurter, for example, saw a useful distinction between 'broad stan-
dards of fairness written into the Constitution (e.g., 'due process,' 'equal protection of
the laws,' just compensation'), and the division of power as between States and
Nation . . . [which] allow[s] a relatively wide play for individual legal judgement,"
and "very specific provisions of the Constitution" whose "meaning was so settled by
history that definition was superfluous." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
144. POSNER, supra note 18, at 398-99.
145. See id. The conceptual ideography of the Constitution, in other words, invites
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perspective, forensic interpretation likewise comprehends that
an overly rigid formalism, for example an idge fixe about the
historical lines of division of powers, will make it difficult to
maintain "a Nation capable of governing itself effectively."'46
Forensic interpretation, as discussed in Part I, is methodologi-
cally prescriptive.'47 It uses the "values of lawyering"14 8-the
eclectic use of common law conventions and multiple strands of
interpretive theory-to guide the judiciary toward reasoned out-
comes in the setting of a written Constitution. 4 ' It encourages
judges to navigate every case and issue without a pre-set meth-
odological compass. 50 In other words, forensic interpretation is
formalism. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing Jack Rakove's ob-
servation that interpretation of the Constitution often requires deep analysis of un-
defined key words and brief phrases); see also Richard S. Kay, American
Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 16, 29 (Larry
Alexander ed., 1998) (noting the interpretive "play" invited by such iconic phrases as
"necessary and proper," "faithfully execute," "freedom of speech," "due process," and
"equal protection").
146. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (noting that "a hermetic sealing off of
the three branches of Government from one another would preclude the establish-
ment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively"); see also Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (expecting "that practice will inte-
grate the dispersed powers into a workable government").
147. See supra text accompanying note 20.
148. GRIFFIN, supra note 15, at 158.
149. In Griffin's analysis, even a formalistic theory makes an implicit normative
assumption that it is preferable not only to have a written constitution, but also a
written constitution that becomes "legalized" as the object of forensic scrutiny
-through the ordinary course of litigation, for example-in the same way as a stat-
ute or a principle of the common law. See id. at 17, 148. Moreover, forensic inter-
pretation safeguards the primacy of interpretation over the complex and difficult
process of amendment. For the United States, a deep practice of interpretation has
been, as Louis Henkin observes, a more congenial method of assuring a "dynamic,
flexible, hospitable Constitution." LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 273 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1972); see also Sandalow, su-
pra note 89, at 1046 (concluding that "[t]he amendment process established by arti-
cle V simply will not sustain the entire burden of adaptation that must be borne if
the Constitution is to remain a vital instrument of government").
150. In a recent article, Richard Fallon suggests that proponents of formal theories
"must rely at least in part on predictions about the results that judges would reach
under their approaches." Fallon, supra note 48, at 562. Perhaps this is true; what it
better reveals, however, is Fallon's implicit fear that formalist theorizing (origin-
alism, for example) will accept unconscionable outcomes in the name of consistency.
As this Article argues, however, the nature of constitutional interpretation, and of
common law reasoning, means that no single theory can secure the preeminence that
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valuable because it both reflects an eclectic process that actually
occurs, and favors that process normatively.151
When originalists complain, for example, that purposive rea-
soning lacks external standards, they are ignoring deliberately
the power of the forensic method. Certainly, one can strive for
an interpretive method of absolute neutrality, where a theory is
chosen irrespective of its potential outcomes. That is positivism
of the most virulent sort; indifference to consequences, as opposed
to an inability to foresee all the consequences, has never been
the method of constitutional interpretation in the United States,
however much Justice Scalia and others .may rail against lodging
undemocratic discretionary power in the federal judiciary.52 To
the extent it exists, that power is constrained not by the artifices
of formalism, but by recurring adherence to the eclectic reason-
ing of the forensic method. As Cass Sunstein concludes in his
recent study, "common law thinking lies at the heart of
would make this fear reasonable. Thus, although forensic interpretation does not
predict precisely the results of its application, it predicts that those results will at
least meet a normative standard of coherence and tradition. See id. at 573 (imposing
on judges, in giving reasons for their decisions, an obligation of "methodological
integrity," and arguing that the absence of such an obligation would provoke cyn-
icism).
151. Naturally, one could imagine alternative jurisprudential universes where a
forensic constitutional interpretation would be supererogatory, and even anomalous.
For example, constitutional questions could be decided a priori by a commission of
experts on referrals from members of Congress, in a fashion not dissimilar to the
Framers' abandoned project of a council of revision. See RAKOVE, supra note 7, at
261-62. The commission might be charged to apply a rigid, positivistic textualism,
stripped of exception, equity, or subtlety, and presumably the populace gradually
would accept this form of centrally planned adjudication as conventional. The Su-
preme Court, however, does not operate in that way; it plucks its docket from the
hopper of ordinary litigation, and has no institutional capacity to give the kind of
pre-enactment advisory opinion that high courts enjoy under some European consti-
tutions. See Allan Randolph Brewer-Carias, General Report on the Domestic Consti-
tutional Implications of Participation in a Regional Integration Process 75 (July 30,
1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). For further ruminations on
alternative systems of constitutional review, see MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CON-
STITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (viewing judicial review as elitist, and
advocating congressional majoritarianism in its place).
152. For an interesting examination of how Justice Scalia, an advocate of
originalism, nonetheless has practiced forensic interpretation in his decision making,
see Nichol, supra note 68, at 971-73 (analyzing Justice Scalia's counterhistorical reli-
ance on structure and precedent).
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American constitutional law."' Sunstein, however, takes the
common law method to be a "plausible competitor to the popular
forms of originahsm. ' 4 Forensic constitutional interpretation
shows that Sunstein is too effacing in his embrace of the com-
mon law. Under the principles considered in this Article,
originalism cannot compete with the common law method. As
Part III of this Article demonstrates using a paradigmatic pair
of Supreme Court cases, originalism, like all of the interpretive
methodologies discussed in Part I, is considered properly an
organic element of that eclectic method.
B. Outcome Sensitive Judicial Interpretation
The idea that the working judiciary would believe in the to-
temic interpretive properties of any one of the methodological or
substantive theories discussed in Part I is fanciful. If a clear
decision could be obtained through application of a strict version
of any of these theories, interpretation itself would be superflu-
ous.'55 As Martin Rogoff suggests, however, interpretation is a
work of art,5 ' and like all true art it must have its afflatus, its
creative moment of inspiration. In fact, the interpretive inspira-
tion is imbued deeply with political considerations. In the com-
mon law, the judge who interprets the Constitution is never
simply "la bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi."5 7 Legal
rules and theories of interpretation are, as Akhil Amar states,
153. SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 240.
154. Id. at 241.
155. In Posnerian terms, interpretive "isms" create a false sense of objectivity and
axiomatic accuracy. Posner himself condemns a mistaken impression that interpreta-
tion resembles cryptography or translation-ironically, the very word used by Lessig
and Sunstein to describe their neo-originalist theory, see supra text accompanying
note 78-whereas, in Posner's view, the comparison is more realistically with the
"reading of palms and the interpretation of dreams." POSNER, supra note 18, at 199.
156. See Rogoff, supra note 15, at 612.
157. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, DE L'EsPR1T DES Lois bk.
11, ch. 6 (1748). Translated, it reads: "It]he mouth which speaks the words of the
law." See John Henry Merryman, The French Deviation, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 109,
111-12 (1996). In contrast, the civil law tradition gravitates, at least theoretically,
toward the idea that judges are merely the mouthpieces of a preordained statutory
code. See generally VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 457-87 (1999) (contrasting the training and outlook of common law and
civil law judges).
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the tools in the kitbag of the interpreter, 158 but each interpreter
comes to the task with a (not necessarily unique) political tem-
perament or inclination, and that perspective is expressed
through the methods of interpretation, not generated by them.'
59
This notion that judges are sensitive to outcomes is well-
canvassed in the literature. 6 ° To take one example, Joseph
Hutcheson imputes to judges an initial "'hunching' out," to be
followed by "the logomachy, the effusion of the judge by which
that decree is explained or excused."' 6 ' Uncovering the political
animus of the judiciary-what Richard Fallon would call the
"pre-interpretive" understanding that launches the work of anal-
ysis16-_is a principal task, and merit, of legal scholarship; 63 it
causes Justices like Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg to
be celebrated as avatars of the right or left."'
158. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61. Thus, Laurence Tribe postulates
that there is unlikely to be any "defensible set of ultimate 'rules'" of interpretation.
Tribe, supra note 14, at 73. Insights and perspectives would exist, but not rules. See id.
159. On the centrality of value judgments to the interpretive process, see Sinnott-
Armstrong & Brison, supra note 6, at 12. Richard Posner writes of "reasoning from
the top-down," which requires judges to invent a theory and then to "use[] it to
organize, criticize, accept or reject ... cases to make them conform to the theory."
POSNER, supra note 18, at 172. I do not suggest that anything so ample as a theory
is required; a defined outcome (for example, that sovereign immunity will prevent
states being sued on federal claims in their own courts) will be facilitated by the
dialectical organization of the opinion. See infra text accompanying note 215.
160. In a recent essay, Michael Doff finds it impossible to believe that judges
might not be outcome sensitive. In Doffs understanding, the formulation of answers
in particular cases will always precede the generation of a constitutional theory. See
Doff, supra note 137, at 594.
161. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the
"Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278-79 (1929).
162. See Fallon, supra note 48, at 540-41.
163. S7e Steven D. Smith, Rationalizing the Constitution, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 597,
602-03 (1996).
164. No doubt this approach is the heritage of the legal realist school, lately recast
as the "attitudinal" model of judicial behavior. See GRIFFIN, supra note 15, at 132. In
this context, I am not troubled by so-called insider perspectives on how the Supreme
Court actually operates behind its impassive public fagade. Human frailty being
what it is, it surely never occurs to most outsiders that the nine Justices would, or
ever could, each behave like Dworkin's stalwart Hercules. The memoirs of one recent
law clerk, published in apparent disregard of the Court's ethics of confidentiality,
suggest that the interpretive work of the Rehnquist Court is driven almost exclu-
sively by "personality and politics rather than considered judgment." EDWARD LAZ-
ARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWrrNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIc STRUGGLES
INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 287 (1998). Surely the high place of politics in the
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But outcome sensitivity cannot mean that judges hand down
their decisions using only vatic insight, or by sheer force of
office.'65 The common law system is deeply rational; it demands
reasons, and judges cannot, and ought not, shirk from every
mechanism of ratiocination that their intellections, and the legal
academy's, can provide.'66 Though it is true that the reasoning
process, the selection and ordering of argument, is the epiphe-
nomenon (the initial inspiration is the phenomenon),' it is also
the case that the reasoning process must persuade.'68 Precisely
Justices' preopinion deliberations will come as no surprise more than eight decades
after the insights of legal realism. But Lazarus, in the midst of a searingly critical
narrative, makes a cogent point about the conversion of raw power into acceptable
legal discourse-a conversion that is supposed to separate ordinary politics from the
higher function of impartial, deliberative decision making by an independent judi-
ciary. Lazarus argues that the Justices must defy the efforts of journalists and aca-
demics to bracket them politically and ideologically, their work must show more
than "five votes supported by doctrines of convenience." Id. In this light, judging
must provide "a tense engagement between the competing arguments in a case-an
honest statement of the most powerful theories. underlying each side's view." Id. at
286. Whether the present Court meets these ideals-Lazarus believes that the
Justices' alleged lack of serious collective deliberation means that it does not, see id.
at 285-Lazarus's critique surely goes more to the durability of its jurisprudence
than to its normative compliance with the principles of the forensic method.
One aspect of what the current Justices do on the record is troubling. Who
could not be dismayed by the petulant and captious characterizations that discordant
justices increasingly level at their opposing colleagues's reasoning? This occurred
most notably in the Court's recent decision in Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240
(1999). The reader can pick through the expressions of mutual pique without my
assistance; I am content to pose the question of why any of the Justices tolerate
this gratuitous institutional self-abasement. True, lawyers lambaste one another all
the time in their submissions to the courts; but this is one taint of common law
advocacy that the judges need not mimic and that diminishes the force and durability
of their reasoning.
165. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 614 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (giving
short shrift to ex cathedra announcements as a judicial method).
166. As Steven Smith writes in a tight critique of academic constitutional exegesis,
legal scholarship does not make the law more determinate. It multiplies the number
of approaches and perspectives, and greatly extends the spectrum of arguments and
reasons that can be used to justify or criticize those arguments. See Smith, supra
note 163, at 612. Smith attacks the "Constitution of the law reviews," an ethereal
plane of pure reason where the mocking realities of everyday life are imagined
away. Id. at 621.
167. To borrow Stephen Griffin's conceptualization, judicial reason-giving is a "sec-
ond-order inquiry" into the validity of "first-order judgments" that have been reached
before the opinions are written. GRIFFIN, supra note 15, at 3.
168. In fact, this is a powerful normative statement that goes to the heart of our
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for this purpose, the professional habits of the judiciary repro-
duce the advocacy habits-including eclecticism--of the common
law.'69 Individual Justices have been unable to preach a philoso-
phy within the Supreme Court that will mesmerize colleagues
across a wide portfolio of cases and issues, and hence face the
perpetual task of assembling coalitions, and of projecting coher-
ence and principle in the midst of compromise."70 Whether an
opinion is persuasive ultimately is also the work of later benches
and of scholars, but it is decidedly not the product of any judge's
choice to become an unshakeable textualist, structuralist, or
originalist (or, for that matter, a Posnerian pragmatist). 7 '
constitutional culture. Sometimes, opinions do not persuade within the conventional
legal discourse, and extraordinary controversy explodes. The thinly reasoned,
conclusory premises of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), have been thought to fall
into this category. See generally LAZARUS, supra note 164, at 364 (noting that a
right to abortion was not fundamental in 1973). Cass Sunstein expresses it well:
"Opinions of this sort [very thinly reasoned or overly conclusory] violate norms as-
sociated with legal craft." SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 16.
169. Laurence Tribe betrays some annoyance with this fact of legal life, but it is
hardly to be expected that judges will not try to "sweep aside all aspects of...
text, history, and structure that do not quite fit [their] preferred grand design."
LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 25 (1991).
If the forensic method works at all, it works precisely to validate successful demon-
strations of this partisan methodology.
170. See GRIFFIN, supra note 15, at 138.
171. See Fallon, supra note 62, at 16 (asserting that in a judicial act, what makes
one answer seem right will be external to the rule applied, culturally contingent,
politically biased, or otherwise contestable). Mark Tushnet also rejects the idea that
a choice of a particular constitutional theory could truly constrain judges; at most, a
theory would provide "a set of rhetorical devices" that judges could use as they
thought effective. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and Experi-
ence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 747, 751 (1992). For those reasons, in fact, Tushnet stresses
the importance of having people capable of reasoned judgment in judicial office. See
id. at 761-62. In the absence of compelling theory, Tushnet maintains, "judgment is
all that remains." Id. at 762. For Tushnet, the Warren Court was composed of Jus-
tices who (like Dworkin's Hercules) had the prior political formation to make them
supremely confident in the rectitude of their judgments. See id. at 761. In contrast,
the present Supreme Court does not share that kind of experience in the political
marketplace, and as a result, the Justices' personal ethical formation must rank of
higher importance in their judicial work. See id. at 762-63. Performance, informed by
character, may substitute for the lack of prior public experience, or so Tushnet
would hope to discover. See id.; see also Fallon, supra note 48, at 566-67 (noting
that "probabilistic knowledge" about judges' personal values and backgrounds may
allow prediction of judicial decisions under formalistic and substantive interpretive
theories). Other jurists, too, have been struck by a lack of fealty among the present
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III. AN APPLIED DEMONSTRATION: FORENSIC INTERPRETATION
AND THE NEW FEDERALISM
Forensic interpretation calls to mind the shrewd taxonomy of
Dutch law professor Filip De Ly, who speaks of believers and
nonbelievers, and a great third class of pragmatists and real-
ists.'72 If the naming of De Ly's first two categories hints at the
furies that sometimes stir the textualists and the originalists, it
is the holders of the third-and by no means residual-position
among whom forensic methodology will find most appeal. For
reasons that become apparent in this final Part, I include in De
Ly's third class the current Supreme Court. As noted earlier, the
Court shares the academy's collective unwillingness to privilege
any particular school of constitutional hermeneutics, 7 ' but sotto
voce the present Justices have endorsed forensic interpretation.
To advance this assessment, I have selected two cases, sepa-
rated by a period of more than two decades, in which the Court
was asked to bridle some of the national governmental power
using principles of federalism-known, in one brand of populist
political discourse, as "States' rights."1'7 4 The cases are the 1978
ruling in United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commis-
sion,7'5 and its controversial close-of-term-and virtually close-of-
century-opinion in Alden v. Maine,"7 6 handed down in June
1999. Incidentally, both cases illustrate that a particular theo-
retical approach can rise to forensic prominence even after a
cycle of disuse. As shown below, structuralist arguments, so
recently eclipsed among scholars by textualism and origin-
Justices to their supposed favorite theories. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 8.
172. In a recent study, Professor De Ly classifies scholars who are debating the
value of a commercial jus commune in the European Union into optimists, skeptics,
and pragmatic realists. See Filip De Ly, Lex Mercatoria and Unification of Law in
the European Union, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 41, 43 (1998). De Ly be-
lieves that analogous scholarly encampments flourish in the arena of an emerging
uniform law of international commercial contracts, and deployed the taxonomy men-
tioned in the main text in an address at the XVth International Congress of Com-
parative Law at Bristol, England on July 30, 1998. (Transcript on file with author.)
173. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
174. See, e.g., The Federalism Revolution, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1999, at A18.
175. 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
176. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
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alism,177 were conspicuous when the Supreme Court wanted to
scrutinize federalism as a principle of limited, rather than re-
lentlessly expansive, central government.
A. Harmonious Federalism: The Multistate Tax Compact
Controversy
1. Justice Powell's Majority: Overcoming Literalism
The Compact Clause in Article I, in relevant part, provides
that "W[no State shall, without the Consent of Congress,...
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or
with a foreign Power."17 1 In United States Steel, the Court exam-
ined whether this constitutional prohibition on interstate com-
pacts without congressional approval acted as a flat prohibition
on all such agreements unless Congress first granted its sanc-
tion.17 9 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell conceded imme-
diately that the clause, "[r]ead literally," says exactly that.'
Briefed fully on the implications of a literal reading, 8 1 the Court
nevertheless found, "[alt this late date," that it could not "cir-
cumscribe modes of interstate cooperation that do not enhance
state power to the detriment of federal supremacy." 8 ' In so
stating, the Court placed a signal, at the very head of the opin-
ion, that it planned to approve state action that does not en-
croach on federal lawmaking powers. The Court therefore ac-
177. See GRIFFIN, supra note 15, at 150-51.
178. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
179. See United States Steel, 434 U.S. at 454. Appellants were a group of corporate
taxpayers threatened with audits by the allegedly unconstitutional Multistate Tax
Commission, an interstate authority eventually involving 21 states. See id. Among
the Commission's purposes were to facilitate determination of state and local tax
liability of multistate taxpayers, including the equitable apportionment of tax bases
and settlement of apportionment disputes, and the avoidance of duplicative taxation.
See id. at 456. Despite its interstate characteristics, the Commission was required to
resort to the compulsory process of the separate states in order to punish failures to
comply with its reporting requirements. See id. at 475.
180. Id. at 459.
181. The appellant taxpayers had urged the Court to adopt a literal reading of the
text. See id. at 460.
182. Id. In making this assertion, the Court relied on its own precedents establish-
ing a fimctional, rather than literal, reading of the Compact Clause. See infra text
accompanying notes 183-84.
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cepted as a threshold matter that only some forms of unap-
proved interstate cooperation must be within the contemplation
of the Constitution's prohibition-a pragmatic functionalist
view"a that would overcome the "difficulties" implicit in a
literalist interpretation." And Justice Powell's functionalism
could draw some support from the Court's own precedents. A
prior Court ruled in 1893, for example, that the Compact Clause
could not be read literally, a position approved in later dicta.
1 81
Otherwise, presumably, the business of the people-in this case,
a multistate agreement on tax administration-could not get
done. '8
As forensic interpretation would anticipate, the Court's opin-
ion had twin methodological dimensions. The first, mentioned
above, was the doctrinal support of precedents. The Court quickly
used these earlier rulings to overcome the implications of strict
construction.' Because its strongest precedent dated from 1893,
the Court felt moved evidently to provide further interpretive
reasoning in a case filed on behalf of seventeen major interstate
183. In this sense, functionalism means utilitarianism. It is an interpretive practice,
fitting broadly under the rubric of pragmatism, that examines the context in which
a particular constitutional provision appears and seeks to ensure that the provision
"functions" in harmony with that context. To mention the word pragmatic in consti-
tutional analysis, at least latterly, may be to threaten an unbounded Posnerism.
This is not the intention of this otherwise quite ordinary (and not pejorative!) usage
in the present Article, where it appears as a broad synonym for utilitarian or func-
tionalist (as in pragmatic functionalism). For example, a pragmatic functionalist
reading of the Treaty Clause in Article II of the Constitution might accept that
certain kinds of treaty instruments could be adopted efficiently by the President
alone without the cumbersome procedures of formal Senate consent-and this is
precisely what has happened in our constitutional practice, through the convention of
so-called "executive agreements." See HENKIN, supra note 149, at 215, 221-24.
184. See United States Steel, 434 U.S. at 459 (describing the Compact Clause as
covering all agreements "irrespective of form, subject, duration, or interest to the
United States" (emphasis added)). Notice the practice of "translation" in Justice
Powell's imputation of a national concern to the Framers. See supra notes 77-89 and
accompanying text (explaining translation as a neo-originalist interpretive method).
185. See United States Steel, 434 U.S. at 459-60 (citing Virginia v. Tennessee, 148
U.S. 503 (1893)).
186. The Court opened its opinion with a recitation of the tax agreement's purpose
and history. See id. at 454-56.
187. See id. at 459-60 (citing New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363 (1976); Vir-
ginia, 148 U.S. at 503).
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corporate taxpayers 188 that refurbished the reasoning of its pre-
cedents for a modern administrative setting. The second dimen-
sion of its opinion selected a number of interpretive theories that
would allow the Court to make its own transition from the abso-
lutism of the literal Compact Clause to toleration of a congres-
sionally unapproved agreement, even one that arguably did not
intrude on the powers of the central government. 8 9
In fact, the Court moved explicitly from precedent to history;190
but originalist ideas proved scarcely helpful to its analysis. The
Framers lacked any documented understanding of what "agree-
ments" and "compacts" might have meant at the founding (in
juxtaposition, for instance, with treaties).' 9 ' Unfortunately, con-
cluded the Court, "[t]he records of the Constitutional Conven-
tion... are barren of any clue as to the precise contours of the
agreements and compacts governed by the Compact Clause;
"192
but just as obviously the Framers meant something by these
different usages. In the Court's view, the absence of recorded
commentary suggested that agreements and compacts were un-
derstood as contemporary terms of art, "for which no explanation
was required and with which we are unfamiliar."' 93
188. See id. at 458 n.7.
189. See id. at 472-79.
190. In particular, the Court considered whether "history" might cause it to recon-
sider the earlier cases. Id. at 460.
191. The Treaty Clause declares that "[no State shall enter into any Treaty, Alli-
ance, or Confederation." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. Yet the Compact Clause per-
mite the States to enter into "agreements" or "compacts" provided congressional con-
sent is obtained. "T'e Framers clearly perceived compacts and agreements as differ-
ing from treaties." United States Steel, 434 U.S. at 460 (footnote omitted).
192. United States Steel, 434 U.S. at 460-61.
193. Id. at 462 (footnote omitted). Before abandoning its attempt to reconstruct the
Framers' understanding, the Court also discussed inconclusive authority from inter-
national law publicists like Emmerich de Vattel. See id. at 462-63 n.12. By 1833,
Justice Story was taking the view that no categorical definitions explained the dif-
ferences among the terms agreements, compacts, and treaties. He therefore pro-
ceeded to develop his own theory, distinguishing treaties and alliances (forbidden to
the States because of military and political implications) from mere compacts and
agreements, which embraced private rights of sovereignty such as boundary ques-
tions and other issues of convenience in the relationships of states. See 3 JOSEPH
STORY, COMIMIENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1397, at 271-
72 (Da Capo Press, reprint 1970) (1833). After that point, the Court's own precedential
history began to take shape. See United States Steel, 434 U.S. at 463-64.
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If neither text nor history yielded enough explanatory power,
what was left? Returning to its earlier prediction of outcome, the
Court raised the possibility of a decidedly non-Posnerian prag-
matic resolution. 9 4 As intimated by Justice Powell, a "functional
view" of the Compact Clause now presented itself.9 ' The Court
no longer trawled for meaning in the textual opposition of agree-
ments, compacts, and treaties. Rather, it treated the Compact
Clause in more broadly contextualized terms, as a pillar of the
Constitution's temple of harmonious federalism. As such, the
Clause could be understood to concede to the states an area of
unchained cooperative action beyond the domain of federal law-
making supremacy.' It is compelling to note the Court's insis-
tence on a structuralist principle-the underlying principle of har-
monious federalism-to justify its apparent textual apostasy. 197
In this light, if the interstate agreement, whatever it was
called,98 respected the underlying federal structure of the gov-
ernment, it would pass muster under the Constitution notwith-
standing whether Congress had conferred its prior approval.' 99
The mere form of the interstate arrangement-an agreement, a
compact, or simply an understanding to adopt reciprocal legisla-
tion-would never be dispositive. °° Thus considered, it would be
an "evasion of the constitution to place the question upon the
formality with which the agreement [was] made.""°' In sum, the
194. See supra note 183 (discussing the distinction between Posnerian theory and
ordinary pragmatism in constitutional interpretation).
195. United States Steel, 434 U.S. at 468.
196. The notion of a harmonious federalism appeared in the Court's earlier opinion
in New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1 (1959), a case that involved reciprocal state legis-
lation rather than compacts, but where the Court spoke of a constitutional tolerance
of "fruitful interstate relationships" designed with "a view to increasing harmony
within the federalism created by the Constitution." Id. at 6.
197. See United States Steel, 434 U.S. at 470. The idea of an underlying principle-a
deep structure principle-is Chomskyan. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
198. For example, some forms of interstate arrangements simply called for recipro-
cal legislation rather than more formalized compacts or agreements. See United
States Steel, 434 U.S. at 470.
199. See id. at 470-71.
200. See id. at 470. Thus, the Court honored the structuralist precept that "[t]he
Constitution looked to the essence and substance of things, and not to mere form."
Id. (citation omitted).
201. Id. The majority used conventional common law reasoning to explain that
Court precedents approving only certain bilateral interstate agreements did not nec-
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Court regarded the only relevant test as being whether the tax
compact enhanced the power of the states "quoad the National
Government."" 2
2. Justice White's Dissent: The Counterfunctionalist Response
A signature of the forensic method is that it is methodologi-
cally, not substantively, prescriptive; accordingly, it anticipates
that the common law convention of dissent will also supply fire-
power for gauging persuasiveness and for later transforming
acts of reinterpretation. To demonstrate, I single out only one
aspect of Justice White's complex dissent in United States Steel,
his counterfunctionalist reply to the majority's reading of the
Compact Clause. If one views federal control over interstate
commerce as virtually plenary, as the Supreme Court typically
has done,20 3 then a multilateral state tax agreement that would
apportion "revenues, sales, and income of multistate and multi-
national corporations for taxation purposes is an area over
which the Congress could exert authority, ousting the efforts of
any States in the field."20'
Under the Commerce Clause, Justice White reasoned that
states individually "may legislate in interstate commerce until
an actual impact upon federal supremacy occurs.20 5 For individ-
ual states, the harm of potential impact was insufficiently dis-
essarily constrain its acceptance of broader forms of agreement involving more than
two states. See id. at 472 (finding that "the precise interstate mechanism involved in
this case has not been presented to this Court before").
202. Id. at 473. The Court examined the elements of the proposed tax agreement
and found that its terms did not intrude upon Congress's powers in interstate com-
merce. In particular, it found that the States had power to do separately what they
proposed to do collectively under the agreement. See id. at 473-78.
203. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 949 (1997) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (noting that the Court has "never suggested that the failure of the early
Congresses to address the scope of federal power in a particular area or to exercise
a particular authority was an argument against the] existence" of that power or
authority;, that assertion, if followed, "would undermine most of our post-New Deal
Commerce Clause jurisprudence").
204. United States Steel, 434 U.S. at 481 (White, J., dissenting). In Justice White's
view, therefore, it was the province of the federal government "to oversee conduct of
a greater effect than a single State could accomplish, to protect both its own prerog-
ative and that of the excluded States." Id. at 483.
205. Id. at 484.
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quieting to require advance congressional sanction. °6 For states
that choose to act in concert, however, "'potential ... impact
upon federal supremacy' [was] enough to invoke the requirement
of congressional approval."207 In this circumstance, to require
Congress actually to pass a statute preempting the field (for
example, by fixing a federal tax apportionment formula) would
accord no force to the Compact Clause independent of the Com-
merce Clause.08 If congressional approval was unnecessary
because there was no actual encroachment, then what would be
the autonomous "function" of the Compact Clause? "The Clause
must mean that some actions which would be permissible for
individual States to undertake [would] not [be] permissible for a
group of States to agree to undertake."0 9 To put it another way,
"[i]f the way to show a 'potential federal interest' require[d] an
exercise of the actual federal commerce power, then the purposes
of the Compact Clause, and the Framers' deep-seated and spe-
cial fear of agreements between states, would be accorded abso-
lutely no respect."210 Justice White was unwilling, therefore, to
read the need for congressional approval out of the Constitution,
although he did accept that it may be granted tacitly.21'
Justice White chided the majority, in a closing coda, for seeing
to it that there was "very little life" left in the Compact
Clause.212 The majority's functionalist interpretation was sup-
ported by an abstract structuralist principle-harmonious feder-
alism-that Justice White thought had become too detached
from the underlying text of the Compact Clause. As noted in
Part I, rapid textual disconnection is a hazard of structural
analysis. 21" As it turned out, the detachment inspired a powerful
206. See id.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 489.
209. Id. at 482.
210. Id. at 489.
211. See id. at 485-86. Justice White took this position, which on its face seemed
an awkward fit with his apparent preference for a literalist reading of the Compact
Clause, on the pragmatic ground that he viewed the Clause as functionally "concilia-
tory" rather than "prohibitive." Id. at 496. In other words, Congress would apply its
political judgment to each agreement, and on occasion might not choose to express
consent formally. See id. at 486.
212. Id. at 496.
213. See supra text accompanying note 42.
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counterfunctionalist dissent-and, not without irony, a literalist
argument for a balancing of federal and state power that cer-
tainly could further the majority's avowed purpose of harmoni-
ous federalism.
B. Disharmonious Federalism?: Alden and State Sovereign
Immunity
1. Justice Kennedy's Majority: Another Foray Against
Literalism
The United States Steel ruling, delivered at approximately the
midpoint of the Carter presidency, might now be seen as a har-
binger of the present Court's return to what a thin majority of
its Justices regard as authentic protofederalism. Thus, Alden v.
Maine214 arrived, more than twenty years after United States
Steel, in a much more ideologically charged atmosphere, where
federalism-the balance that the Constitution strikes between
national and state powers and privileges-has become a major
jurisprudential battleground.2 15 Moreover, whereas United States
Steel probed a specific textual provision of the Constitution,
214. 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
215. The immediate backdrop to Alden was a series of cases beginning with United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the first Supreme Court decision since the New
Deal to strike down a statute as lying beyond the congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 31. Sunstein read Lopez as a "sig-
naling device" to Congress, but also to judges and the legal profession, that the
Constitution is one of "enumerated rather than plenary powers," so that a
recalibration of the balance of power between the national government and the
states could be expected. Id. at 31-32. Two years later, in Printz, the Supreme Court
intensified its earlier signal, holding that Congress lacked authority to impose on
state enforcement officials an obligation to make background checks on potential gun
buyers. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997). The Court found that
that requirement would be inconsistent with the dual sovereignty foundation of the
federalist system. See id. at 932-33.
Incidentally, Alden was one of a trio of cases decided on the same day, all of
which expressed an expansive view of State sovereign immunity. In the other two
related cases, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999), and College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999), the Supreme Court
rejected attempts to justify, as legitimate exercises of Congress's remedial power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, explicit congressional abrogation of
the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States from suits for violation of the
federal Patent Act and the false advertising provisions of the federal Lanham Act.
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Alden involved a more difficult-and more intellectually compel-
ling-inquiry into a purported "fundamental postulate" of the
constitutional design,216 the sovereign immunity of the states in
their own courts, that is nowhere mentioned in the Consti-
tution's text. In this setting, the majority's opinion was self-con-
sciously a performance of forensic constitutional interpretation.
The opinion, delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, canvassed
"history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the Constitu-
tion"217 to assert that the states do enjoy an immunity from
private federal claims in state courts.218 This immunity could not
be abridged by Congress even in aid of federal schemes of regu-
lation adopted under its immense legislative powers in Article I.
Alden concerned the jurisdiction of the state courts of Maine
to entertain a private lawsuit by a group of probation officers
against their employer, the State of Maine, alleging violation of
the overtime provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 (FLSA).219 The statute expressly authorized private ac-
tions against states in their own courts without regard to state
consent,220 but the Supreme Court acknowledged an apparent
split between two state supreme courts-Maine and Arkan-
sas--on the constitutionality of this authorization. 2 ' Although
there is no constitutional language ordaining an explicit state
sovereign immunity,222 the Court was not entirely bereft of a
textual resource. The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution
was adopted in 1798 to overturn a Supreme Court ruling five
216. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2254.
217. Id. at 2260.
218. See id. at 2268-69.
219. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-
219, 557 (1988)).
220. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(x), 216(b). One clarification should be made. The Court
had held previously, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), that Congress
did not have the power to abrogate an unconsenting state's immunity in federal
court under the Eleventh Amendment. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76; see infra
text accompanying note 224. In fact, the plaintiffs probation officers in Alden first
brought suit in federal district court, but the court dismissed the suit on the author-
ity of Seminole Tribe. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246.
221. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246.
222. As noted earlier, see supra note 67, and as Justice Souter would punctuate in
his dissent in Alden, the Constitution never mentions the word "sovereignty" at all.
See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2270 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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years earlier in Chisholm v. Georgia218 that the Judiciary Article
of the Constitution authorized a private citizen of another state
to sue the State of Georgia in federal court without its prior
consent.2 4 The Amendment provides that "[tihe Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State."2 25 This text reproduces, and effec-
tively rescinds, the original language in Article III, Section 2, of
the Constitution, which extended the judicial power to contro-
versies "between a State and Citizens of another State," and
"between a State... and foreign... Citizens, or Subjects."226
Thus, read literally, the Eleventh Amendment describes a circle
of immunity that includes only diversity lawsuits that were
permitted under the original language of Article III, Section 2.227
The Alden Court, therefore, seemed immediately to face a re-
fractory literalism similar to its earlier dilemma in United States
Steel.
To achieve its outcome of applying state sovereign immunity
in state courts, therefore, the majority would need to overcome
the plain reading that the Amendment simply carved out a nar-
row slice of immunity-that is, diversity lawsuits-from a broad
general principle of state suability. Flipping the reading, the
Court instead would find that the Amendment shut down a
loophole of suability that perhaps the Framers had opened inad-
vertently in an otherwise universal and indefeasible doctrine of
state sovereign immunity. How would the Supreme Court justify
this inverted interpretation, confronting the obvious silence of
the Constitution and the plain meaning of the Eleventh Amend-
ment?
As in United States Steel, the Court invoked each of the pri-
mary methodologies of forensic interpretation. Applying, first,
223. 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419 (1793).
224. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2250. The literal text of Article III of the Constitu-
tion suggested that the Chisholm Court was correct. See id.
225. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
226. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
227. Suits, in other words, by any nonstate citizen, including a citizen of any for-
eign country, against any state, in any federal court. See supra note 224 and accom-
panying text.
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the institutional conventions of the common law, it uncovered
case support for its motivating idea that the Eleventh Amend-
ment merely exemplified a wider constitutional truism-that
states may not normally be subject to any private lawsuits with-
out their consent-rather than crafted an exception to a compet-
ing understanding that states normally are suable by private
citizens.228 The Court also distinguished "isolated statements"
from earlier cases suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment
could not apply in state courts." 9 The Court deployed familiar
techniques of the common law advocate, spotlighting "footnote
digressions," "irrelevan[cy]" to a holding or rationale, "unneces-
sary" discussion, and confining unhelpful precedents to "narrow
proposition [s]."O
The majority argued that the holdings on which it relied re-
flected "a settled doctrinal understanding... that sovereign
immunity derive[d] not from the Eleventh Amendment but from
the structure of the original Constitution itself."2"' Integrating
precedents under the rubric of structure allowed the Court to
pass from conventional common law justification to more dynamic
arguments based on interpretive theory. Thus, the Alden major-
ity relied on a structuralist assumption of the viability of the
states after the adoption of the Constitution, an assumption
based on the limited and enumerated powers of the national
judicial and political branches and the resolving power of the
Tenth Amendment, which reserves undelegated powers "to the
States respectively, or to the people."
23 2
The Court concluded that, within their proper spheres of sov-
ereignty, the states "form distinct and independent portions of
228. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2253-54, 2258, 2270.
229. Id. at 2257.
230. Id. at 2257-58. The Court's decision in Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990),
for example, was distinguished conventionally as a case that withheld immunity
from a subgovernmental unit, a school board, that the Court found not to be an
"arm of the State." Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2259. Avoiding the issue presented by the
analogy of state and sub-state authorities, the Court found that Howlett "did not
address the question of Congress' power to compel a state court to entertain an
action against a nonconsenting State." Id. at 2259-60.
231. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2254 (emphasis added). Later in its opinion, the Court
would need to consider the unhelpful implications of Chisholm, the case that pro-
voked the Eleventh Amendment. See infra text accompanying note 242.
232. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2247.
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the supremacy, no more subject ... to the general authority
than the general authority is subject to them, within its own
sphere."233 Recognition of such state supremacy within certain
reserved spheres, however, would not necessarily procure for the
states a constitutional immunity from the lawful exercise of the
national powers, including subjection to suit in their own courts,
within the proper sphere of Congress's limited and enumerated
authority.2 4 The Court's response, couched again in structural
terms, insisted that the constitutional "design," as explained at
length in The Federalist,235 empowered Congress to regulate
individuals rather than states, and thus departed from the
state-centered experience of the Articles of Confederation.2 6 In
the Court's constitutional polity, the states were more than
"mere provinces or political corporations" 237 and possessed "the
dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty."28 In other
words, the scope of state immunity was determined not by the
Eleventh Amendment's text alone, but by a structural underlay
that the majority called "fundamental postulates implicit in the
233. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)).
234. This had to be a telling objection for the majority because Justice Souter's
dissent made much of a distinction drawn historically between the acts of the sover-
eign itself-to which a strong presumption of immunity has attached-and the acts
of other sovereigns, where immunity has had, at the least, a murkier pedigree. See
id. at 2270 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that no evidence existed of an inherent
sovereign immunity "when the sovereign sued was not the font of the law"). To be
frank, Justice Kennedy simply dodged the challenge, relying on the absence of much
contrary evidence-a conventional brief-writing device-and some writings of early-
twentieth-century English scholars to rebut the proposition. See id. at 2257.
235. See id. at 2247 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 20 (James Madison & Alexander
Hamilton)). Reliance on The Federalist has itself become a staple convention of con-
stitutional analysis, irrespective of the political or ideological complexion of the in-
voking judge. As Jack Rakove explains, nothing has equaled this collection of com-
mentaries in analytical scope or conceptual power. See RAKOVE, supra note 7, at xv.
236. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2247.
237. Id. Later in his opinion, Justice Kennedy lightly embellished this phrasing to
read "mere prefectures or corporations." Id. at 2268. He did not explain, however,
whether his usage was merely striving for effect or if he intended a helpful juridical
comparison with the unit of French administration called the prefecture.
238. Id. at 2247. In his dissent, Justice Souter found the majority's exaltation of
the dignity of the states, see id., to be distasteful to the republican idea of the Con-
stitution, see id. at 2269 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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constitutional design." 9 These arguments showed the Court
attempting to bond textualism and Blackian structuralism with
the eclectic animus that forensic interpretation would expect,
and predict. The point is not whether the argument is persua-
sive-its metaphorical tilt might offend originalists and struc-
turalists in equal measure-but that it was expected by the
Court to persuade.
The Court also availed itself of arguments that might be des-
ignated historicist/originalist, looking at the prevailing view of
state sovereign immunity among the generation that designed
and adopted the federal system of government.24 In doing so,
the Court construed the absence of discussion of state immunity
as proof of the well-established status of the doctrine, noting
that arguments raised by states' advocates against the Constitu-
tion-that federal jurisdiction under Article III would not re-
quire state consent-made sense only if the states were under-
stood at the time of the founding to have a preexisting immunity
in their own courts.241 Justice Kennedy portrayed Chisholm v.
Georgia-which, as the dissent emphasized, appeared to vitiate
his historical reconstruction 242 --as an unfaithful reading of the
Constitution.2' He recalled that the majority in Chisholm had
failed to address the practice and understanding of the states at
the .time the Constitution was adopted and had conceded,
through expectation of an unpopular and surprised reaction to
their decision, that they had defied the prevailing wisdom.2' For
the Alden majority, therefore, the Eleventh Amendment was a
kind of synecdoche for the deeper idea that the Constitution, in
239. Id. at 2254.
240. See id. at 2247.
241. See id. at 2263. Otherwise, using early Court rulings, the writings of jurists,
and the testimony of the Rhode Island and New York ratification debates, Justice
Kennedy assembled an orthodoxy that a specific doctrine of state sovereign immunity
had survived the framing of the new Constitution. See id. at 2247-49. Quoting again
from The Federalist, Justice Kennedy emphasized Alexander Hamilton's confidence
that "[t]he contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the con-
science of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force." Id. at 2248
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)).
242. See id. at 2283.
243. See id. at 2250.
244. See id.
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its history and structure, upheld the states' traditional compre-
hensive immunity from private suits.
2 4
Finally, in the spirit of pragmatic functionalism, the Court
used public policy arguments as crossbracing for its structural,
textual, and historical edifice. Fearing a federal attempt, as he
put it, "to commandeer the entire political machinery of the
State against its will,"24 Justice Kennedy argued that a denial
of immunity would strip from the states their sovereign power to
determine priority among claims on the "public fisc."
247
2. Justice Souter's Dissent: A Dynamic Functionalism
Justice Souter, joined by three colleagues, filed a lengthy
dissent in Alden.248 What is most instructive about the dissent,
as constitutional theory, is that its dialectical method-a blend-
ing of history, precedent, structure, and public policy-so closely
tracked the majority's forensic reasoning.249 If anything, Justice
245. For the Alden majority, State immunity trumped even the virtually plenary
legislative authority of Congress under Article I. Backed by the Supremacy Clause,
it might well have been expected (consistently with precedents allowing Congress to
impose social legislation on the states as employees) that the federal government
simply could legislate to subject the states to suit in their own tribunals. But the
Court, again thinking structurally, held that the Supremacy Clause enshrined as
supreme law only acts of the federal government "that accord with the constitutional
design"--including, presumably, the a priori sovereign immunity of the States. Id. at
2255. The Court used identical reasoning with respect to any implied extension of
Congress's enumerated authority through the Necessary and Proper Clause, holding
that a law that violated the principle of state sovereignty could not properly execute,
for example, the Commerce Clause. See id. at 2264.
246. Id.
247. Id. The majority did acknowledge some limits to the sweeping immunity it was
enunciating. In particular, the immunity could bar suits only in the absence of con-
sent, and could not prevail under the Constitution against suits brought by other
States or by the federal government. See id. at 2267. Moreover, Congress may au-
thorize private suits against nonconsenting states using its enforcement power under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. But see supra note 215 (discussing recent Su-
preme Court opinions circumscribing even this power in favor of state immunity).
Further, as noted earlier, immunity will bar suits against states but not against sub-
state entities such as municipal corporations or other governmental entities that are not
arms of the state. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267. The Alden Court did not discuss the
constitutional status of a private federal claim brought against a state, in its own
courts, by a citizen of that state. Although this precise circumstance is not included
in the categories of federal jurisdiction in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, it
presumably would be excluded caeteris paribus by the general reasoning of Alden.
248. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269-95 (Souter, J., dissenting).
249. See id. This parallelism is perfectly legitimate in forensic interpretation. As
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Souter indulged himself in heavier historical beachcombing than
did the majority, and scrutinized the writings of many
more-and rather more obscure-publicists.250  Some parallel,
too, can be detected between Justice Souter's primary thesis,
directed to the implications of the Eleventh Amendment, and the
dissent filed by Justice White in United States Steel. 25 ' Each
Justice believed that the majority's reading sapped normative
power from a clear constitutional directive. Justice White de-
cried the emasculation of the Compact Clause, while Justice
Souter accused the Alden majority of rendering the Eleventh
Amendment "beside the point," on the ground that a fundamen-
tal principle of state sovereignty, confirmed by the Tenth
Amendment, would have precluded the need for constitutional
confirmation that states also enjoyed this immunity in federal
courts.252 Like Justice White, therefore, Justice Souter struck at
the dialectical heart of the majority's opinion, which had strug-
gled from the outset with a need to prefer one interpreta-
tion-the Eleventh Amendment as a specimen of a much wider
Akhil Amar indicates in a recent essay, all legitimate forms of argument can be de-
ployed on both sides of a given issue. See Amar, supra note 39, at 772.
250. Only the final purpose of Justice Souter's historical lucubrations need be con-
sidered here. Using the ambiguities and disputes of early state practice (including
the ratification debates), as well as the works of philosophers, historians, and jurists,
he sought to demonstrate that sovereign immunity-had the question been
posed-was not conclusively thought in early postrevolutionary America to shield a
state from suit under federal law on a subject reserved to the national jurisdiction
by Article I. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2270; supra note 238. In Justice Souter's his-
tory, the prerogative of state sovereign immunity was a creature of the common law,
unmentioned at the Constitutional Convention, and therefore a proper object of con-
gressional abrogation. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2283. To the extent that Hamilton
mentioned state immunity in The Federalist, it was as a principle of natural rather
than constitutional law, something that inhered in the nature of sovereignty-itself a
subject little treated at the Convention, and indeed sovereignty was a word that was
conspicuously omitted from the Constitution. See id. at 2275, 2280; supra note 67.
Moreover, members of the majority in Chisholm, see supra text accompanying notes
242-44, seemed to favor a revolutionary ideology that treated immunity as an anom-
alous residue of the imperial order. In that quondam order, the sovereignty of princes
could never be perceived, as it was in America, as a joint tenancy with "the people."
Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2281 (Souter, J., dissenting); see supra note 238.
251. See supra notes 203-13 and accompanying text.
252. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269 (Souter, J., dissenting). A broad view of immunity,
moreover, would have allowed the states to escape any judicial power, whether the
court be state or federal, and whether the claim arose under state or federal law.
See id.
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immunity-at the expense of a second, and textually more plau-
sible, interpretation-the Amendment as an exception to a wider
suability.23 Justice Souter seemed to suggest that the majority's
sweeping view of immunity would make the Eleventh Amend-
ment a peculiarly asymptotic exercise, because the broader no-
tion of immunity could just as readily have been stitched into
language that ultimately went for ratification to presumably
receptive state legislatures.2 5
In closing, Justice Souter maintained that the absence of
precursors to the legal claim pursued in Alden must not pre-
clude an evolution of constitutional principles in "A world that
the Framers could not have anticipated.255 He believed that the
reach of the modern Commerce Clause made it impossible to
rely on calcified doctrines like sovereign immunity.2 56 Ironically,
Justice Souter's dynamic vision of federal/state relations-a
pragmatic functionalist view-ultimately put him philosophically
closer to the harmonious federalism of the majority in United
States Steel than to Justice White's literalist dissent.
253. See supra text accompanying note 227.
254. As considered earlier, see supra note 245 and accompanying text, the majority
dismissed Justice Souter's objection that immunity did not apply unless the sover-
eign was itself the source of the challenged law. See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269-70.
This objection was a recurring preoccupation in Justice Souter's dissent, see id. at
2285, 2294 (Souter, J., dissenting), for which Justice Souter enjoyed some
precedential support. In Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353-54 (1907), the
Court held that, "in the case of multiple sovereignties, the subordinate sovereign will
not be immune where the source of the right of action is the sovereign that is domi-
nant." Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2287 (Souter, J., dissenting). Thus, state sovereign immu-
nity should not have been available to block private enforcement of the challenged
law in Alden that emanated from the Article I authority of Congress. See id. To the
plaintiffs' lawyers reading Kawananakoa, the nature of Justice Souter's objection
must have looked like a precision weapon in the war against Maine's view of sover-
eign immunity.
255. Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2291. Justice Souter argued that cases like Alden were
historically rare because Congress had not always felt comfortable subjecting the
states to legislation-and private causes of action in state court,-under the authority
of the Commerce Clause. See id.
256. See id.
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C. Some Thoughts on the Federalism Debate and Forensic
Interpretation
I have demonstrated the application of the forensic method by
examining two cases from the formalistic jurisprudence of gov-
ernmental structure and design, rather than the hot-blooded
arena of civil and political rights. This does not diminish the
resolving power of the method. The Framers of the Constitution
organized design principles like federalism as the first line of
defense for individual rights.251 It is true that federalism itself
was intended, as Robert Nagel puts, "to maintain a rough sys-
tem of power allocation over long periods of time."25 Nagel as-
sumes incorrectly, however, that structural opinions are not nec-
essarily based on the injustice of depriving a single individual of
a particular allocation of authority. 59 As in Alden, these opin-
ions may come down to precisely that, and the amenability of
state power to individual challenge becomes an issue of proce-
dural due process and personal liberty.
The broader issues of governance, in any event, will always
command our independent attention. The United States Steel
and Alden majorities exploited the range of the forensic method
to defend a vision of power allocation, with all of the internecine
rivalry and claims of ruffled sovereignty that the allocation has
always implied."' After all, the Framers did not abolish the
257. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 63, at 1155-56 (describing the use of
structural devices-such as separation of powers-to preserve individual liberty as
the "genius" of the Constitution).
258. NAGEL, supra note 35, at 81.
259. See id. at 82.
260. The importance of the project of reconciliation of the sovereigns cannot be
understated. The Framers, conscious of what Madison called the solecism of an im-
perium in imperio--two sovereigns coexisting in a common territory-seemed to re-
solve the paradox by having the federal government operate directly on the individual
citizen. See RAKOVE, supra note 7, at 153; Raoul Berger, Jack Rakove's Rendition of
Original Meaning, 72 IND. L.J. 619, 637 (1997). This was a capital solution to what
seemed a constitutional absurdity to many of the Framers; unfortunately, it never
explained fully or rationalized the content of state sovereignty in relation to the new
federal polity. As Rakove indicates, if the states were perceived as losers in the
dynamic competition for power, and because power itself was dynamic, their authority
might continue to atrophy. See RAKOVE, supra note 7, at 182. Further, the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause and the Supremacy Clause established a constitutional basis
for legislation that could overturn state government at a stroke. See id. at 184.
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states; they assumed that some subsidiarity" l would persist
even as a new national power center assumed dominance. To
that extent, the Court's federalism concerns serve a continuing
purpose to implement the constitutional design favoring a de-
fined role for the states. Flexibility under the Compact Clause
was an obvious and successful expansion of state authority in
the practical field of tax administration; the Alden Court's wide
reading of state sovereign immunity may have been less justifi-
able practically, particularly in light of the role played by the
states today in the commercial marketplace, 26' but undoubtedly
must carry talismanic significance in the construction, or recon-
struction, of a harmonious federalism. If occasionally the Su-
preme Court fine-tunes the balance toward one locus of power or
the other, but does so within the expectations of common law
reasoning and the methodology of eclecticism, it respects the
constitutional culture.26
261. The principle of subsidiarity, developed in the jurisprudence of the European
Union, expects that certain legislative and administrative responsibilities will be
discharged at national or regional level by locally franchised bodies. See generally
MARGOT HORSPOoL ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW 93-95 (1998) (discussing the ori-
gins of subsidiarity).
262. See Dorf, supra note 137, at 594 (suggesting that the Supreme Court's post-
New Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence, until very recently, was insufficiently
responsive to the Framers' strategy of enumerating specific national powers).
263. See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
119 S. Ct. 2219, 2234 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
264. Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court's Alden ruling has spurred much debate
about the proper limits of the national power. The practical consequence of Alden is
clear: Maine's probation officers will get the overtime pay for which they sued only
if the federal government sues on their behalf under the FLSA. Should the Supreme
Court have left these federal rights unenforceable in private lawsuits-in federal and
state courts-against state employers? See supra note 247 (discussing enforcement in
federal court). Congress can constitutionally impose minimum wage laws on the
States, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); there-
fore, is it appropriate, or merely inconsistent, to police state compliance with these
laws exclusively through litigation brought by the federal government? If inconsistency
is detected, the Court may in the future overrule Seminole Tribe, which barred pri-
vate suits against the States in federal court, see supra note 220, while preserving
Alden. For opposing views of the jurisprudential backwash of Alden, see Charles
Fried, Supreme Court Folly, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1999, at A17; Michael Greve, Feder-
alism Is More than States' Rights, WAU ST. J., July 1, 1999, at A22.
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CONCLUSION
As Richard Fallon argues, legal interpretation should be
purposive, not rigid or mechanical, and "the variety of sources of
law to which a legal interpreter can appeal includes principles
and policies as well as canonical texts."265 The strict textualist or
originalist may disparage result-oriented reasoning as provoking
mayhem, 266 but the premise of this Article is that mayhem more
likely resides in the proffered alternative-a blinkered and unre-
liable assembly of sources that does not know, or claims not to
know, its destination until the place is reached. Moreover, nei-
ther the Constitution nor the constitutional culture has elevated
to primacy any single group of justices, or any single theory of
interpretation. 7 That some judges are wise, and some are fool-
ish, is not something for which constitutional theory can sensi-
bly control.2 68 By emphasizing eclecticism, forensic constitutional
interpretation enables every judge to interpret with integrity, if
not always to become Hercules.269
265. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Comparing Federal Courts 'Paradigms,' 12 CONST. COM-
MENTARY 3, 4 (1995) (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and
Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 965 (1994)).
266. See Berger, supra note 260, at 620.
267. And, to underscore an earlier point, the Justices of the Supreme Court have
not coalesced around a specific theory. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
268. In a recent essay, Rebecca Brown includes a wonderful quotation from Felix
Frankfurter that seems particularly appropriate here. Frankfurter called on judges for
allegiance to nothing except the effort, amid tangled words and limited
insights, to find the path through precedent, through policy, through
history, to the best judgment that fallible creatures can reach in that
most difficult of all tasks: the achievement of justice between man and
man, between man and state, through reason called law.
Rebecca L. Brown, Constitutional Tragedies: The Dark Side of Judgment, in CONSTI-
TUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, supra note 20, at 139, 139.
Brown observes that the Lochner Court was faithful to the text of the Consti-
tution, and to contemporary societal values of liberty to contract and liberty to sell
one's labor. See id. at 140. She warns, however, that "[a]ll constitutional theorists
must allow for the possibility of error." Id. at 143. Was the Court in error, or just
reflecting a moment in the evolution of a constitutional understanding?
269. To repeat Akhil Amar's motif, "[aill proper techniques of constitutional inter-
pretation can be used by both liberals and conservatives alike." Amar, supra note
39, at 801 n.204. Liberal textualists of one generation can become conservative
textualists of another. See id.
